

LEBANESE MUSLIMS IN AUSTRALIA AND SOCIAL DISADVANTAGE

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Recent events have focused public attention on people of Muslim Lebanese background (most of whom live in Sydney) and the possibility that they may suffer social disadvantage. Using data from the 2001 Census, this paper finds that Lebanese Muslim households are large and much more likely to be poor than are all households, or than Lebanese Christian households. It also finds that Lebanese Muslim men have low levels of education, relatively high levels of unemployment, and a very high tendency not to be in paid work. The second generation is doing rather better than the first, but it is still not doing very well.

INTRODUCTION

People from the area now known as Lebanon have a long history of migration to Australia. Jim McKay identifies three main waves. First, small groups arrived, beginning in the late nineteenth century up until World War II. They worked as hawkers, traders and shopkeepers and established a thriving settlement in Redfern in Sydney. Though Christian, nearly all were illiterate peasants but, despite this, they integrated well. They and their children prospered and, within a couple of generations, had almost completely assimilated. Their numbers (counted in terms of those born in Lebanon) never went much beyond 2000.¹ A second stream arrived from 1947 to 1975, most of them after 1966 and the Arab/Israeli war of 1967. At the 1976 census the Lebanon-born population reached 33,000. More of this second wave came from urban areas than before, but most were still Christian. After 1975 the third stream arrived, people displaced by the Lebanese Civil War. They came from both sides of the conflict — Christian and Muslim. Muslims were now present in substantial numbers and, between 1976 and 1981, the Muslim Lebanon-born population grew from just under 7000 to around 15,600.²

In 1971, 14 per cent of the Lebanon-born population in Australia had been

Muslim; in 1981 the Muslim share had grown to 31 per cent.³ Though Muslims in Lebanon are disproportionately Shi'ite, Michael Humphrey (writing in 1988) estimated that Lebanese Muslims in Australia were about two thirds Sunni and one third Shi'ite.⁴ Most of the Shi'ites came from the poverty stricken South of Lebanon, but via Beirut. Even though their region of origin was poor, those who reached Australia were from a higher socio-economic bracket than the Sunnis, who came from the North. For example Shi'ite women were better educated, more likely to have paid work, and lived in slightly smaller households than Sunni women.⁵ While most settled in Sydney, especially in the South-Western suburbs, the Sunnis established the Imam Ali Mosque in the suburb of Lakemba and the Shi'ites the Al-Zahra Mosque in Arncliffe.⁶

By 2001, there were 62,334 Lebanon-born people in Australia, constituting more than one third of all immigrants from the Middle East,⁷ and the children of the third wave, most of them Australia-born, had reached adolescence and early adulthood. Sydney and Melbourne have been the two main regions of settlement, especially the Canterbury/Bankstown region of Sydney (which includes Lakemba). Of all overseas-born Lebanese

people in Australia in 2001, 72.4 per cent lived in Sydney.⁸

The migrant intake from Lebanon since 2000-2001 has been between approximately 1100 and 1600 per annum, most entering as spouses or fiancé/ées. While the current program focuses on skills, including proficiency in English, these criteria are not taken into account with spouses and fiancé/ées. As before, most still settle in South-Western Sydney.

PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION

The history of social and political dislocation in Lebanon may have given the second and third waves a poor start in Australia. The parental generation has had difficulty finding work and, unlike the children of the Southern European migrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s, the second generation may not be doing well either. The third, post-1975 wave, suffered all the problems that come with refugee status and forced departure, while the Muslims among them lacked the pre-existing ethnic institutions of church and community networks that had been established by earlier waves of Christians.⁹

Headlines over the last eight or nine years have drawn attention to Lebanese crime and to police searches for suspects 'of Middle Eastern appearance'.¹⁰ Lebanese Muslim clerics such as Sheik Taj el-Din al Al-Hilali, known as the mufti or spiritual leader of Australia's Muslims and imam of the Sunni Mosque in Lakemba,¹¹ or Sheikh Abdul Salam Zoud, are often in the news in disquieting contexts.¹² And on Sunday 11 December 2005 gangs of locals assaulted Lebanese youths at Cronulla beach (see Barclay and West this issue), followed by revenge attacks on beachside suburbs by Lebanese gangs the following evening.¹³

A number of commentators have concluded that Sydney has a Lebanese

problem and that this is largely a Lebanese Muslim problem.¹⁴ This perception comes at a time of growing apprehension about Islamic fundamentalism and its links with terrorism, especially as some terrorists have been brought up in the countries they attacked, or planned to attack. Three of the four London suicide bombers of 7 July 2005 were British-born and, of the 19 suspected terrorists arrested in Australia in November 2005, all but one was Australian-born.¹⁵

No one is suggesting that the Lebanese men who frequented Cronulla Beach or carried out the revenge attacks were motivated by Islamist beliefs. On the contrary, observers have remarked that, if any culture influenced them, it was American rap music and the alienated hip hop culture from which this stems.¹⁶ A few, however, argued that this culture, together with a deprived background, may provide a recruiting ground for Islamists.¹⁷

A culture of victimhood appears to animate many Muslims, including Islamists. Tariq Modood writes: '...there is a sense that Muslim populations across the world are repeatedly suffering at the hands of their neighbours, aided and abetted by the United State and its allies, and that Muslims must come together to defend themselves'.¹⁸ And Shahram Akbarzadeh writes that:

It is no secret that Muslims in Europe, Australia and North America feel besieged. ... Street vandalism is a manifestation of frustration and an ingrained sense of injustice. It reflects the extremely debilitating culture of victimhood ... [which] dooms Muslims to helplessness and outbursts of frustration.¹⁹

Feelings of oppression and alienation may draw some young people to a rap culture which is also fired by the themes of 'rejection, victimhood and revenge'.²⁰

or may even attract them to more extreme forms of alienation. ASIO reports that, while most Islamic extremists in Australia are influenced by foreign events, others believe they do not really belong to Australian society or to their parents' society. They see the world as a battle between Muslims and unbelievers and are filled with 'a sense of isolation and rejection'.²¹

Feelings of victimhood felt by many Muslims are relevant to understanding the Lebanese in Australia. The Lebanese Civil War was grounded in a growing sense amongst Muslims that Western models of government had failed and that the revival of an authentic Islam would provide a viable alternative.²² Thus the war saw a growing hostility between revivalist Islam and Western culture. With eyes turned to Europe, many Lebanese Christians saw Lebanon as the eastern limit of Western culture. By contrast, Lebanese Muslims often saw it as the Western-most limit of Middle-Eastern culture. They saw Western culture as aggressive and 'often felt threatened, offended, and angered as they saw their traditional culture being overwhelmed by Westernisation'.²³

A sense of marginality in Australia could lead to Islamist extremism or merely to poverty and the risk of criminal activity. But is the popular belief in disadvantage among Lebanese Muslims, extending to the second generation, well founded? We know quite a lot about the first generation and something about the second generation, but official data seldom distinguish between Christian and Moslems.²⁴ Given the history one might expect the two communities to have kept themselves apart in Australia. But journalists report contradictory findings. Sometimes they write that Christian and Muslim Lebanese youths are similar in the

way they present themselves to the world, 'sporting the same trendy haircuts and Western-style clothes';²⁵ at other times they claim that remnant Christians in Bankstown have been moving out to get away from Muslims.²⁶

In this paper we draw on data from the 2001 census to look for answers to four key questions: do Lebanese Muslims in Australia suffer from social disadvantage relative both to Lebanese Christians and to the wider population; do Christians and Muslims of Lebanese ancestry live in the same areas, or are they geographically dispersed; if Lebanese Muslims are disadvantaged, does this disadvantage persist among the second generation: and are disadvantaged Muslims (and Christians) concentrated in particular areas. Note that from here on we will use the term *Lebanese* to refer to people who gave their ancestry in the 2001 Census as Lebanese.²⁷ We will continue to use *Lebanon-born* for people born in Lebanon.

BACKGROUND: THE GROWTH OF ISLAM IN AUSTRALIA

While Lebanese Muslims account for a significant proportion of Australia's Muslim population, other Muslims have immigrated as well. Many others have been born here, while a number have become converts. The first two of these factors have led to a rapid growth in numbers.²⁸

Table 1 shows a small Muslim population of 22,000 in 1971 but one that had expanded to 1.5 per cent of the total population, or 282,000 people in 2001, an average annual growth rate of 8.88 per cent.²⁹ The Muslim population had begun to increase in the late 1960s with immigration from Turkey as well as Lebanon but the rapid growth in the 1970s can be largely attributed to migrants from Lebanon.³⁰

Table 1: Religious affiliation in Australia, 1971 to 2001

	1971		1981		1991		2001	
	'000s	%	'000s	%	'000s	%	'000s	%
Christianity	10,990	86.2	11,133	76.4	12,422	73.7	12,764	67.3
Buddhism	—	—	35	0.2	137	0.8	358	1.9
Hinduism	—	—	—	—	43	0.3	95	0.5
Islam	22	0.2	77	0.5	147	0.9	282	1.5
Judaism	62	0.5	62	0.4	73	0.4	84	0.4
No religion	856	6.7	1,577	10.8	2,161	12.8	2,906	15.3
Other	826	6.6	1,692	11.6	1,867	11.1	2,483	13.1
Total	12,756	100.0	14,576	100.0	16,850	100.0	18,972	100.0

Sources: 1971 derived from Bouma et al. 'Muslims managing religious diversity', in Saeed and Akbarzadeh (Eds), 2001 (see note 30) p. 54; 1981 *Cross-Classified Characteristics of Persons and Dwellings: 1981 Census*, Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Cat. no. 2452.0, Canberra (1983), pp. 112-113; 1991 to 2001, Census data held by the Monash Centre for Population and Urban Research (CPUR)
 Note: 'Other' includes religion not stated or inadequately described, and overseas visitors; data on overseas visitors' religions are not collected

Others, however, have come from Asia, Europe (including Bosnia) and elsewhere. In 2001, 22 per cent of Australia's Muslims were of Lebanese ancestry and a further 26 per cent traced their ancestries to other Middle Eastern or North African countries.³¹ Thus just under half of Australian Muslims have their origins in the Middle East or North Africa. Net permanent and long-term migration from this region averaged 5850 per annum from 1959 to 2005 but there were two prominent spikes in 1969-1970 and 1976-1977 (both of around 11,500 net immigrants a year), a more moderate and sustained increase during the 1990s, and a marked increase from 2002 when numbers increased to around 13,300 a year.³² However many are Christian or have no religion; around 42 to 43 per cent may be Muslim.³³

We can gain a sharper picture of the legacy of the three waves of Lebanese immigration from data on those who gave their ancestry as Lebanese at the 2001 Census. The advantage of choosing ancestry as the key variable, rather than birth place, is that it allows us to focus on Lebanese people who were born in Australia as well as those who are overseas born. A drawback is that ancestry is a

subjective measure. For example, people who no longer feel part of any Lebanese community in Australia may choose not to identify as Lebanese, a factor that may well apply to many assimilated descendants of the early first wave.

In 2001 there were 147,500 people of Lebanese ancestry in Australia, 42 per cent overseas born. Among all people of Lebanese ancestry, 53 per cent were Christian and 39 per cent Muslim. Though Christians outnumbered Muslims, both groups were similarly distributed between the Australia-born and the overseas-born (55 per cent Australia-born, 42 per cent overseas-born and three per cent birthplace not stated).³⁴

Given the more recent immigration of Muslims, this similarity may seem surprising, however it can be partly explained by higher Muslim fertility. The age structures of the two Lebanese populations are very different. In 2001 the Lebanese Christian community had a median age of 32.3 years, close to that of the total population (35.7 years). But the median age for Lebanese Muslims was only 22.3 years.³⁵

Among Australia-born Lebanese, 51 per cent of Christians were aged 0 to 19

compared with 76 per cent of Muslims.³⁶ This points either to high fertility or a youthful profile among the parental cohort or both. It is not possible to estimate fertility directly (for 2001) as no question was asked on the number of children born to each woman. However this question was asked in the 1996 Census and Carmichael and McDonald calculate that Muslim women's fertility then was 37 per cent higher than average. This estimate does not distinguish between Muslim women by different countries of birth. But data on the average number of children per women by country of birth show that women born in the Cook Islands had the highest number of all, 58 per cent above that of Australia-born women, followed by women born in Lebanon, who had 54 per cent more.³⁷ From these two findings we can infer that the fertility of Lebanese Muslim women is well above average.

In the latter section of this paper we will draw on a customised matrix of data from the 2001 Census to examine education and employment outcomes for first and later generations of Lebanese men by religion. It is well established that first-generation Lebanon-born men have had difficulty in the labour market.³⁸ But this could be a consequence, not of any especial problem of discrimination, lack of cultural fit or of self-segregation,³⁹ but rather of the changing nature of the Australian economy. Since the early 1970s there has been a dearth of low-skilled manufacturing jobs and, for the third wave, this dearth was coupled with the settlement difficulties of arriving as refugees or quasi-refugees. It is useful, then, to compare outcomes for the Lebanese with those of the Vietnamese, another group who arrived at around the same time and in similar circumstances. For these comparisons we draw on the one per cent users' file of 2001 Census data.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT

Twenty five years after the third wave of Lebanon-born migrants began to arrive in Australia how were they faring? How, for example, were Lebanese people getting on financially?

Table 2 shows that households where the reference person's religion is Muslim have a lower total weekly household income than households affiliated with other religions, and that their income per household member is very low which may, of course, be due to the disproportionate presence of young children. The situation of Lebanese Muslim households is even worse. They have a much lower weekly household income than Lebanese Christians and their lower income has to be stretched over more members. Indeed their income per household member is half the national average. Households where the reference person's ancestry is Vietnamese are also struggling, especially the Vietnamese Buddhists, but their circumstances are not as stringent as those of Lebanese Muslims. Lebanese Muslim households are larger than those of the other groups shown in Table 2 and contain more children aged 0-14, confirming the picture of high fertility suggested above.

Table 3 suggests that a key reason for low incomes in Lebanese Muslim households is lack of employment. If the analysis is restricted to households where at least one child aged 0 to 14 years is present, the lack of paid work stands out. Vietnamese Buddhist households are also not doing well; over a third have no adult in paid work. But Lebanese Muslim households are worse off. Despite having, on average, one more household member than all Australian households (with children), almost half of the households headed by a Lebanese

Table 2: Median weekly household income by ancestry and religion of reference person, controlling for household size (and showing mean number of children 0-14 per household), 2001

	Median weekly household income	N	Mean household size	Mean no. of children 0-14 per household	Median weekly income per household member
All ancestries by religion					
All households	\$779	60,717	2.58	0.54	\$302
Christian	\$759	42,785	2.54	0.52	\$298
Muslim	\$674	669	3.54	1.11	\$190
Buddhist	\$720	1,032	3.03	0.65	\$237
No religion	\$869	10,134	2.57	0.54	\$338
Ancestry Lebanese					
Christian	\$897	209	3.54	0.89	\$253
Muslim	\$640	129	4.21	1.48	\$152
Ancestry Vietnamese					
Christian	\$745	111	3.94	1.34	\$189
Buddhist	\$720	207	3.62	0.87	\$199

Source: One per cent users' file of the 2001 Census

Note: The analysis omits cases where household income is negative, or some or all incomes in the household are not stated. It also omits cases where household income is not applicable. 'Not applicable' refers to persons in 'other not classifiable' households, persons in non-private dwellings and persons in migratory or off-shore collection districts. The total excluded from the analysis on these grounds is 14,157 (or 18.9% of all households).

Households where the reference person's religion was 'other' or inadequately described or not stated, are not analysed separately.

Muslim have no one in employment at all. Table 3 also shows a marked difference between Lebanese Christian and Muslim households. Christian households are also large (see Table 2), but the proportion with no one employed is no higher than the national average.

The data so far suggest that Lebanese Muslims are in difficulties and are clearly worse off than Lebanese Christians. The comparison with the Vietnamese suggests that these difficulties may be partly

explained by their refugee or quasi-refugee status on arrival in Australia, and by the poor job prospects that low skilled migrants faced in Australia following the decline of manufacturing in the 1970s. But were these difficulties compounded by residential concentration, and are the second generation managing to overcome them? The numbers in the one per cent users' file are too small to provide answers to these questions.

Table 3: Number of people aged 15 plus working in households where at least one child aged 0 to 14 is present by religion and ancestry of reference person, per cent

Number aged 15 plus working	Lebanese		Vietnamese		Total households
	Christian	Muslim	Christian	Buddhist	
None	21	48	23	35	21
One	31	35	33	29	34
Two	38	14	34	30	38
Three or more	10	3	9	6	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	110	112	90	119	21,664
Mean household size	4.8	4.9	4.5	4.3	3.9

Source: One per cent users' file of the 2001 Census

Note: People not in employment are classified as either unemployed or not in the labour force.


LOCATION

A customised set of data⁴⁰ from the 2001 Census allows us to pursue these questions. We identified eight customised residential locations within the Sydney Statistical Division for analysis. These locations were derived by examining levels of residential concentration of the Lebanon-born at the Collection District level (spatial units of 200-300 hundred households). Concentrations ranged from over 20 per cent of residents Lebanon-born to none. Three principal areas of concentration stood out in the West and South West of Sydney. These were in the southern part of Parramatta, in the Bankstown/Canterbury area (which includes Lakemba in the South East) and in the northern part of Rockdale, just south of Arncliffe and the Shi'ite Mosque. Two areas of medium-level concentration were identified on the margins of the first two of these principal areas and a large area of low-level concentration surrounding all three principal areas. In addition, we included two outlying

areas which only had low proportions of Lebanon-born residents but which may have been distinctive in socio-economic terms relative to the major concentrations. These are in Liverpool and Ryde. Figure 1 shows the locations of the eight customised areas. We have simplified their names to: Parramatta core, Parramatta fringe, Periphery, Rockdale, Ryde, Liverpool, Bankstown core, and Bankstown fringe. These names are adopted for convenience and are not always strictly geographically accurate.⁴¹

The customised areas were based on the relative concentration of people born in Lebanon, but the data provided allow us to expand this picture to include all people of Lebanese ancestry, irrespective of birthplace, and to disaggregate the results by religion. Table 4 shows the residential distribution of Lebanese Christians and Muslim in Australia and across the customised areas relative to all Muslims and total persons.

Figure 1: Location of concentrations of Lebanon-born persons, Sydney 2001



Source: Derived from ABS, *Census Basics*, 2001

Table 4: Residential distribution of all persons, all Muslims and persons of Lebanese ancestry, per cent of Australia, per cent of Sydney customised areas, 2001,

	Lebanese	Lebanese — Christian	Lebanese — Muslim	All Muslims	All persons
Part 1 — per cent of Australia					
Sydney SD	72	75	72	48	21
Melbourne SD	19	16	22	31	18
Australia remainder	9	10	6	21	61
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	147,507	80,417	59,830	281,565	18,769,213
Part 2 — per cent of Sydney					
Parramatta core	8	8	8	8	1
Parramatta fringe	8	10	6	8	1
Periphery ^a	19	20	18	19	11
Rockdale	3	1	6	3	1
Ryde	2	3	1	2	1
Liverpool	4	2	7	4	2
Bankstown core	14	11	17	14	2
Bankstown fringe	12	9	16	12	1
Sydney SD remainder	30	35	21	30	80
Sydney SD	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	106,674	60,039	43,284	134,378	3,947,945

Source: ABS, Customised data set held by the Monash CPUR

Note: SD stands for statistical division.

^a Periphery is the area of lower Lebanon-born concentration surrounding the three principal areas of concentration (Parramatta, Bankstown and Rockdale)

Part 1 of Table 4 shows that Muslims are overrepresented in Sydney and that Lebanese people, including Lebanese Muslims, are very much overrepresented. The 2001 census confirms the historical story: most Lebanese migrants have settled in Sydney. But are they concentrated within that city and do the two religious communities live in the same

regions? Part 2 of Table 4 shows their relative distribution in Sydney. Discounting the large areas of the Periphery and Sydney SD remainder, the Bankstown core accounts for the highest proportion of Lebanese — 14 per cent. The degree of concentration of the Lebanese here is highlighted by the fact that this area

Table 5: The Lebanese Muslim/Christian balance in Sydney, and the Lebanese relative to all residents, by customised areas, per cent

	Christians	Muslims	Total	Total Lebanese	Lebanese as % of total residents	Total residents
Parramatta core	58	39	100	8,631	28	30,850
Parramatta fringe	69	29	100	8,554	17	51,783
Periphery	60	37	100	20,444	5	418,650
Rockdale	20	78	100	3,549	16	22,319
Ryde	75	22	100	2,370	4	58,320
Liverpool	25	72	100	4,325	6	75,012
Bankstown core	47	50	100	14,579	15	97,529
Bankstown fringe	44	54	100	12,523	29	43,039
Sydney SD remainder	66	29	100	31,699	1	3,150,443
Sydney total	56	41	100	106,674	3	3,947,945

Source: See Table 4.

accounts for only two per cent of the total population of Sydney.

But there are two ways to measure an ethnic group's concentration: the proportion of a particular group living in a given area, or the proportion of a given area's population that is accounted for by a particular group.⁴² Table 4 demonstrates the first method and Table 5 the second.

Bankstown core shows up as a region of high concentration on both measures, but Table 5 suggests that we should add Parramatta (core and fringe), and Rockdale, and Bankstown fringe as four further areas of concentration. Table 5 also shows that Christians predominate in the Parramatta core and fringe while Muslims predominate in Rockdale. It also shows that Bankstown (both core and fringe) is relatively evenly divided between the two groups. However Table 4 shows that Christians are more likely to live outside the five main regions of concentration than are Muslims.

Thus in some areas of Lebanese concentration Christians and Muslims do live side by side but there is a tendency for some members of the two groups to separate from each other, and Christians are more likely to settle away from the areas of Lebanese concentration altogether. Overall we can say that Lebanese Muslims do cluster rather more tightly as a group, but that there are usually plenty of Lebanese Christians living close by.

But do better-off Lebanese of either faith live outside either the eight areas as a whole or outside the five regions of concentration? And are Lebanese Christians and Muslims of Lebanese ancestry more similar in terms of their educational and labour market outcomes within the areas of greatest concentration or outside them?

POST-SCHOOL QUALIFICATIONS

We will look first for answers in an analysis of relative educational outcomes for Lebanese males. In the main, the data relate to men aged

25 to 44 years, an age group representing males in the prime of their working lives. Of course a full analysis would consider women as well. However there is limited space in an article of this length and an analysis of women's educational achievement (and labour-force contribution), is complicated by their traditional responsibilities for child care, which may be particularly marked in a high-fertility population. It is also likely that, in many cases, the situation of adult men will be more critical to the immediate welfare of their households than the situation of adult women.

First-generation men

We begin by looking at post-school educational outcomes for first generation Lebanese men. For brevity, in the discussion in the sections below, the terms 'Christian men' and 'Muslim men' refer to Lebanese Christian and Muslim men, 25-44 years of age, unless otherwise stated.

Table 6 provides three benchmarks against which outcomes for men in each customised area can be gauged. The first two consist of comparable figures for all first-generation men of Lebanese ancestry, aged 24-44 years, living in either the Sydney Statistical Division or in Australia as a whole. The third consists of the outcomes for all first-generation overseas-born males, aged 25-44 years.

Two findings stand out. First-generation Lebanese men are less likely to have post-school qualifications than are first-generation migrant men in the same age and religious groups. Second, when we restrict the analysis to Lebanese men by religion, Christians are

Table 6: First-generation Lebanese males, 25-44 years, religion by post-school qualifications by customised areas, Sydney 2001, per cent

	Degree	Diploma	None	Total	Total N
Parramatta core					
Christian	5	25	63	100	475
Muslim	4	15	74	100	385
Total	4	21	68	100	869
Parramatta fringe					
Christian	12	28	53	100	538
Muslim	2	18	72	100	256
Total	8	25	59	100	815
Periphery					
Christian	15	29	48	100	1008
Muslim	8	22	62	100	857
Total	13	26	54	100	1925
Rockdale					
Christian	15	28	58	100	40
Muslim	6	18	68	100	346
Total	8	19	66	100	395
Ryde					
Christian	17	29	48	100	96
Muslim	7	7	71	100	41
Total	16	22	54	100	140
Liverpool					
Christian	10	24	57	100	127
Muslim	5	21	67	100	353
Total	6	21	65	100	489
Bankstown core					
Christian	10	31	53	100	634
Muslim	9	20	63	100	875
Total	10	25	58	100	1,549
Bankstown fringe					
Christian	11	27	52	100	504
Muslim	8	18	66	100	682
Total	9	22	61	100	1,212
Sydney SD remainder					
Christian	15	28	51	100	1,630
Muslim	12	20	61	100	973
Total	14	25	54	100	2,733
Sydney SD					
Christian	13	28	52	100	5,052
Muslim	8	19	65	100	4,768
Total	11	24	58	100	10,127
Australia					
Christian	13	26	54	100	6,808
Muslim	8	19	65	100	6,605
Total	11	22	59	100	14,094
Australia, all males 25-44 yrs, 1st generation					
Christian	22	34	38	100	332,371
Muslim	24	20	48	100	40,386
Total	25	30	38	100	628,957

Source: See Table 4.

Notes: The category qualifications not stated is not shown.

Other religions, including no religion and religion not stated are not shown separately, but are included in the totals. Overall, 681 Lebanon-born males fall into this category as do 256,200 of all males, aged 25-44, who are first generation.

The term *degree* includes bachelors and postgraduate qualifications, *diploma* includes advanced diploma, the category *none* is based on the response *not applicable* meaning no post-school qualifications.

consistently likely to be better qualified than Muslims. The only area where Christians do poorly is in their area of greatest concentration: Parramatta core. This is also the area where Muslims do worst as well. Here only five and four per cent respectively have degrees. While there is a pattern of low achievement in the other four areas of concentration, outcomes are rather better in Periphery and Ryde, two of three customised areas showing lower levels of concentration.

However both Christian and Muslim Lebanese do better when they live outside any of the eight customised areas. The minority who live in the rest of Sydney (Sydney SD remainder) are better qualified than the national average for Lebanese men in their age group, and here the achievement of Muslims is much closer to that of Christians: 15 per cent of Christians have degrees and 12 per cent of Muslims. However, even here Lebanese men

lag well behind the standards set by other immigrant men in their age and religious group.

Second-generation men

In this section, the educational level of first-and second-generation Christian and Muslim men is compared for each of the customized areas. (We define *second-generation* as being Lebanese and not overseas born. Given the history of the first wave, this category will include third and fourth generations, as well as second, but their numbers are likely to be few.) It's important to remember that the two groups are the same age: we are not looking at a comparison between fathers and sons.

There are three main findings that can be drawn from Table 7. First, in most (but not quite all) instances second-generation Lebanese men are more likely to be

Table 7: First- and second-generation Lebanese Christian and Muslim males, 25-44 years, proportions with degrees by location, and all Australian males, 25-44 years, 2001, per cent

	Per cent with a degree				Percentage point change 1st to 2nd generation		Percentage point difference between Christian and Muslim		Australia, all males 25-44
	Christian		Muslim		Christian	Muslim	G1	G2	
	G1	G2	G1	G2					
Parramatta core	5	8	4	12	3	8	1	-4	
Parramatta fringe	12	11	2	0	-1	-2	10	11	
Periphery	15	19	8	10	4	2	7	9	
Rockdale	15	17	6	19	2	13	9	-2	
Ryde	17	17	7	17	1	9	9	1	
Liverpool	10	8	5	6	-2	1	5	3	
Bankstown core	10	15	9	12	4	4	2	3	
Bankstown fringe	11	14	8	7	3	0	4	7	
Sydney SD remainder	15	23	12	14	8	2	4	9	
Sydney SD	13	19	8	11	6	3	5	8	
Australia, all males by religion, 25-44	22	15	24	13	-7	-11	-2	2	17

Source: See Table 4.

Note: The term *degree* includes bachelor degrees and higher degrees.

G1 stands for first generation and G2 for second. In fact G2 just means Australia-born and could include third or more generations but, in the case of the Lebanese, the numbers of third or more generation males would be small.

graduates than are the first-generation. This is particularly true of Christian Lebanese men living outside the eight regions (that is, in Sydney SD remainder). This pattern is consistent with earlier research which found a tendency for better off non-English-speaking-background (NESB) people in Sydney to move out of low-income areas of high NESB migrant concentration.⁴³ (It is a curious feature of Table 7 that, at the Australia-wide level, the first generation is better qualified than the second. This is probably an outcome of the post-1996 emphasis on skills in migrant selection.)

Second, while second-generation Lebanese Muslims are more likely to have degrees than the first, the difference is not as marked for them as it is for Christians. Not only do they lag behind second-generation Christian Lebanese they also lag behind all second-generation Muslim men. Third there is no clear pattern of educational disadvantage (at the degree level) among second-generation men living in areas of higher concentration, except Christians in Parramatta core.

Indeed Rockdale (an area of high Muslim concentration) stands out concerning the relative educational gains of the second-generation Muslims. Whereas only six per cent of first-generation Muslims men in Rockdale had degrees, nearly 19 per cent of the second-generation had such qualifications. The numbers however were small; there were only 53 second-generation Muslim men aged 25 to 44 in the area.

Areas where both first- and second-generation Muslim men perform poorly in achieving degree qualifications are Liverpool and the extended low-density periphery. While the numbers in the Liverpool area are also small, this outcome may nevertheless indicate that emerging, outlying concentrations of Lebanese are not necessarily socially upwardly mobile.

If we focus just on those who have diplomas rather than degrees, second-

generation Lebanese do better; 39 per cent of Christians aged 25-44 in the Sydney SD have diplomas as do 26 per cent of Muslims. The figure for all Australian men in the same age group is 34 per cent. But we can get a clearer picture of relative educational outcomes by looking at men (aged 25 to 44) who have no post-school qualifications at all. Given the increasing importance of skills in the modern labour force the absence of post-school qualifications is a clear indicator of disadvantage.

Table 8 re-emphasises the low level of educational achievement for the first generation, both Christian and Muslim. Overall, in 2001 only 40 per cent of all Australian men aged 25 to 44 did not have any post-school qualification. But second-generation Lebanese Christians have made good progress and are less likely to have no qualifications than second-generation Christians in general. Second-generation Muslims have also made progress but they have not done as well. A full 50 per cent have no post-school qualifications. The fact that this outcome is the same for all second-generation Muslim men is not encouraging. Not surprisingly, given the results in Table 9, the Parramatta core stands out as a region of poor achievement for Christians (but so does Parramatta fringe and Bankstown core). As Table 5 shows, the first two areas are regions of heavy concentration for Lebanese Christians. There are also large numbers of them in Bankstown core. Second-generation Muslims also do worse in areas of Lebanese concentration,

Table 8: First- and second-generation Lebanese Christian and Muslim males, 25-44 years, proportions with no post-school qualifications by location, and all Australian males, 25-44 years, 2001, per cent

	Per cent with no post-school qualifications				Percentage point change 1st to 2nd generation		Percentage point difference between Christian and Muslim		Australia, all males 25-44
	Christian		Muslim		Christian	Muslim	G1	G2	
	G1	G2	G1	G2					
Parramatta core	63	40	74	61	-23	-13	-11	-21	
Parramatta fringe	53	44	72	50	-9	-22	-19	-6	
Periphery	48	33	62	50	-14	-12	-15	-17	
Rockdale	58	36	68	58	-22	-10	-11	-23	
Ryde	48	34	71	33	-14	-37	-23	0	
Liverpool	57	41	67	56	-16	-12	-11	-15	
Bankstown core	53	42	63	44	-11	-19	-11	-3	
Bankstown fringe	52	40	66	52	-13	-14	-14	-12	
Sydney SD remainder	51	34	61	48	-16	-13	-11	-14	
Sydney SD	52	36	65	50	-16	-15	-13	-14	
Australia, all males by religion, 25-44	38	42	48	50	5	3	-10	-8	40

Source: See Table 4.

particularly Parramatta core and Rockdale. (Given their high achievement in gaining degrees, this suggests a U-shaped pattern for second-generation Rockdale Muslims. Again, however, interpretation must be tempered by the small numbers.) But neither second-generation Christians nor Muslims do very much better in the more dispersed regions of Periphery, Liverpool, Ryde or

Sydney SD remainder. Living in an area of concentration with co-ethnics may in some instances retard educational achievement, but there is no clear evidence that men in areas of low concentration do better.

The poor performance of second-generation Lebanese Muslim men is particularly striking when compared with men Southern European backgrounds.

Table 9: First- and second-generation Lebanese Christian and Muslim males, 25-44 years, proportions unemployed by location, and all Australian males, 25-44 years, 2001, per cent

	Per cent unemployed				Percentage point change 1st to 2nd generation		Percentage point difference between Christian and Muslim		Australia, all males 25-44
	Christian		Muslim		Christian	Muslim	G1	G2	
	G1	G2	G1	G2					
Parramatta core	9	8	19	22	-1	3	-10	-15	
Parramatta fringe	8	5	17	19	-3	2	-9	-14	
Periphery	6	5	13	13	-1	0	-6	-8	
Rockdale	0	0	12	0	0	-12	-12	0	
Ryde	13	4	15	33	-9	19	-2	-30	
Liverpool	20	8	20	10	-12	-10	0	-2	
Bankstown core	11	6	15	11	-4	-4	-4	-4	
Bankstown fringe	7	8	17	10	2	-7	-10	-1	
Sydney SD remainder	7	4	15	10	-3	-5	-8	-5	
Sydney SD	8	5	15	12	-3	-4	-7	-7	
Australia, all males by religion, 25-44	6	6	14	11	0	-3	-8	-6	6

Source: See Table 4.

For example, in 2001 19 per cent of Australia-born men of Greek ancestry aged 25 to 44 had university degrees, as did 16 per cent of Australia-born men of Italian ancestry. These outcomes equalled or exceeded the achievement of all men in this age group (17 per cent of whom were graduates). Taken as a whole, Australia-born men of Lebanese ancestry aged 25 to 44 were also doing fairly well: 14 per cent had degrees.⁴⁴ But the composite figure conceals marked differences. As Table 7 shows, despite pockets of disadvantage, second-generation Lebanese Christians have, overall, conformed to the pattern of second-generation success. Lebanese Muslims have not: only 11 per cent of second-generation Muslims in Sydney had degrees compared to 19 per cent of Christians.

The high proportions of both first- and second-generation Lebanese Muslim men who have no post-school qualifications, suggest poor labour market prospects for many. The sections below explore the relative labour market performance of Lebanese Christian and Muslim men in Sydney. We focus on levels of unemployment and on men who are not in the labour force.

LABOUR FORCE STATUS

Data for the Sydney Statistical Division show that the proportion of first-generation Christian Lebanese men who were unemployed (eight per cent) was marginally greater than the national figure (six per cent). For second-generation Lebanese Christian men the proportion who were unemployed had normalized to a little lower than the level for all Christian males born in Australia, aged 25-44 years (five per cent). See Table 9.

By comparison, the downward adjustment in unemployment levels from the first to the second generation of Muslim men is marginal (from 15 per cent to 12 per cent), with the rate for the second-generation

remaining well above that of their Christian counterparts. This result is consistent with the national level for all Muslim men (all birthplaces) aged 25-44 years in each generation (14 per cent and 11 per cent).

The data shows a similar outcome for nearly all of the individual areas studied. Although three areas (Ryde, Liverpool and Bankstown core) had unemployment rates well above the Sydney average for first-generation Christian men, these rates had very nearly normalized amongst the second generation, ranging from four per cent to eight per cent. By contrast, with the exception of the Rockdale area where the proportion of Muslim men who were unemployed dropped to zero in the second generation, the proportion of Lebanese Muslim men unemployed ranged between 10 per cent and 33 per cent. Areas with particularly high rates were Parramatta core (22 per cent), Parramatta fringe (19 per cent) and Ryde (33 per cent).

Table 10 on proportions not in the Labour force, shows a similar pattern to Table 9. Proportions not in the labour force are lower in the second generation for both groups, but the rates amongst second-generation Muslim men remain high relative to their Christian counterparts, and high relative to all men in the same age group (9.5 per cent, rounded to 10 per cent in Table 10).

If the rates for 25-44 year old men in Tables 9 and 10 are summed, a similarly disturbing picture of non-involvement in paid work emerges. The proportion of first-generation Muslim men of Lebanese ancestry (aged 25 to 44) who are either unemployed or not in the labour force

Table 10: First- and second-generation Lebanese Christian and Muslim males, 25-44 years, proportions not in the labour force by location, and all Australian males, 25-44 years, 2001, per cent

	Per cent not in labour force				Percentage point change 1st to 2nd generation		Percentage point difference between Christian and Muslim		Australia, all males 25-44
	Christian		Muslim		Christian	Muslim	G1	G2	
	G1	G2	G1	G2					
Parramatta core	19	9	25	17	-10	-8	-6	-8	
Parramatta fringe	17	10	27	19	-7	-8	-10	-10	
Periphery	12	8	22	14	-3	-8	-11	-6	
Rockdale	20	6	19	13	-14	-6	1	-8	
Ryde	9	11	46	17	2	-30	-37	-6	
Liverpool	15	8	26	18	-7	-8	-11	-10	
Bankstown core	16	10	25	16	-6	-9	-10	-6	
Bankstown fringe	14	11	24	18	-3	-6	-10	-6	
Sydney SD remainder	13	6	22	10	-6	-12	-9	-4	
Sydney SD	14	8	24	14	-6	-9	-10	-7	
Australia, all males by religion, 25-44	9	8	22	15	-1	-7	-12.5	-7	10

Source: See Table 4

ranges between 36 and 61 per cent in the areas studied. Although these rates decline in all areas for the second generation, they still range between 13 and 50 per cent (compared to 16 per cent for all Australian men aged 25 to 44).

It is likely that a proportion of men of Lebanese ancestry who appear in census statistics as 'not in the labour force' are receiving the Disability Support Pension (DSP) and that DSP recipients are often *de facto* unemployed rather than physically incapacitated.⁴⁵ Data in Table 11 show that, while dependence on the DSP is not extensive amongst men born in Lebanon aged 25-44 years, it is a major factor amongst those aged 45-64 years. However the DSP recipient data presented in Table 11 relate only to men born in Lebanon, and living in New South Wales (NSW) rather than just in Sydney. Thus they are limited to first-generation Lebanese men and we cannot disaggregate the figures by religion. Nonetheless, Table 11 suggests that many Lebanon-born men of working age who are not in the labour force may be DSP

recipients, especially if they are aged 45 to 64.

If these Lebanon-born men receiving the DSP do tend to appear as not in the labour force in the Census, then one would expect an even more dramatic count for not in the labour force among Lebanese men aged 45-64 years than for the 25-44 age group. Table 12 shows that this is indeed the case.

Unlike the first-generation Lebanese men aged 25 to 44, many of the men in Table 12 are likely to be the fathers of the second-generation men analysed in Tables 7 to 10 above. Although the proportions of both Christians and Muslims who are unemployed are relatively low, the proportions not in the labour force are extremely high. If the proportions unemployed are added to those not in the labour force, then the full magnitude of non-participation in paid employment becomes clear. Table 12 shows that 46 per cent of first-generation Lebanese Christian men, aged 45-64, were either unemployed

Table 11: All male pension recipients and Lebanon-born male pension recipients as a proportion of all males and all Lebanon-born males, respectively, NSW, 2001 by age group, percentages

Age group	Age pension	Disability Support Pension	Other pension**	Total receiving a pension	Not receiving a pension	Total males	Total males (number)
Male pension recipients born in Lebanon							
16-24	na	0.9	0.2	1.1	98.9	100.0	2,147
25-44	na	5.4	1.8	7.2	92.8	100.0	12,217
45-64	na	35.0	2.4	37.4	62.6	100.0	9,960
65+	99.8	1.1	0.1	101.0*	-	100.0	2,562
Total	9.2	15.2	1.7	26.1	73.9	100.0	27,708
All male pension recipients							
16-24	na	1.8	0.1	1.9	98.1	100.0	431,168
25-44	na	3.8	1.1	4.9	95.1	100.0	927,317
45-64	na	12.3	1.1	13.4	86.6	100.0	722,267
65+	62.7	0.2	0.0	62.9	37.1	100.0	361,952
Total	7.3	4.2	0.6	12.1	87.9	100.0	3,116,575

Source: Calculated from CentreLink Pension recipient file, 2001, held by CPUR; and ABS, Census 2001

* This apparent anomaly has occurred because the calculation is based on two separate datasets.

** Includes Parenting Payment Single, Age Carers, Disability Carers and other Carers.

or not in the labour force in the Sydney Statistical Division in 2001, as were 65 per cent of first-generation Lebanese Muslim men. (The comparable figure for all men aged 45 to 64 is 27 per cent.)

Rates for unemployment and not being in the workforce for Christian and Muslim men aged 25 to 44 in the Sydney SD remainder area (see Tables 9 and 10) tend towards the low end of the range, as they do for the older men in Table 12. The difference is not great but suggests that Lebanese men who live outside of the eight areas of Lebanese concentration are rather more likely to have paid work than are those who live within them.

Taking men aged 25-64 as a group, 47 per cent of Lebanese Muslims were either unemployed or not in the workforce, compared to 28 per cent of Lebanese Christians and 21 per cent of all men in this age group.⁴⁶

CONCLUSION

The answers to two of the four questions posed by this article are clear. Lebanese Muslims are disadvantaged compared to

Lebanese Christians (and compared to all Australians, both migrant and native born). The second generation is doing rather better than the first but it is still not doing very well. While levels of achievement in post-school qualifications are poor, it is low levels of participation in paid work that stand out and which probably largely account for the low levels of income that Lebanese Muslim households experience. Thirty-nine per cent of first-generation Lebanese Muslim men aged 25 to 44 in Sydney are unemployed or not in the labour force, as are 26 per cent of the second generation of the same age (compared with 16 per cent of all Australian men in this age group). These rates are high, but they are dwarfed by the 65 per cent of first-generation Lebanese Muslim men aged 45 to 64 who are unemployed or not in the labour force (compared to 27 per cent of Australian men aged 45 to 64).

Answers to the other two questions are less clear. In some instances Lebanese Christians live side by side with Lebanese Muslims. In other instances

Table 12: First-generation Lebanese Christian and Muslim males, 45-64 years, percentage either unemployed or not in labour force, customised areas, Sydney, 2001, per cent

	Per cent unemployed		Percentage point difference between Christian and Muslim	Per cent not in labour force		Percentage point difference between Christian and Muslim	Per cent either unemployed or not in labour force		Percentage point difference between Christian and Muslim
	Chris-tian	Mus-lim		Chris-tian	Mus-lim		Chris-tian	Mus-lim	
Parramatta core	6	8	2	48	59	11	54	67	13
Parramatta fringe	7	11	3	43	62	19	50	73	23
Periphery	7	8	1	39	52	13	46	60	14
Rockdale	0	8	8	36	56	20	36	64	28
Ryde	8	7	-2	37	68	31	46	75	29
Liverpool	6	7	1	54	67	12	60	74	14
Bankstown core	5	7	1	44	63	19	49	70	21
Bankstown fringe	7	9	2	45	55	10	53	64	12
Sydney SD remainder	4	6	2	35	57	21	39	63	23
Sydney SD	6	8	2	40	58	17	46	65	19
Australia, all G1 males, by religion, 45-64	5	8	3	26	44	18	31	52	22
Australia, all males, 45-64		4			23			27	

Source: See Table 4.
G1 = First generation

they do not. Sometimes low levels of ethnic concentration are associated with higher levels of achievement — see for example the higher proportions with degrees or jobs who live outside the eight areas of concentration. In other instances high ethnic concentration does not seem to impede success — witness the high proportion of second-generation Lebanese Muslim graduates in Rockdale, together with their low level of unemployment (though the numbers involved here are small).

Many second-generation Lebanese Muslim men have no post-school qualifications and are either unemployed or not in the labour force. Overall, Lebanese Muslim households tend to be relatively large, poor and disconnected from paid work. Given the times, the situation is not promising.

References

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- ² *ibid.*, p. 18; J. McKay and T. Batrouney, 'Lebanese immigration until the 1970s', and C. M. Young, 'Lebanese immigration since 1970', in J. Jupp (Ed.), *The Australian People*, Angus and Robertson, North Ryde, 1988, pp. 666-670, 673. Numbers of Lebanon-born Muslims are calculated from Young, p. 675.
- ³ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 675
- ⁴ M. Humphrey, 'Muslim Lebanese' in Jupp (Ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 677. (There were also small numbers of Druse and Alawi.)
- ⁵ *ibid.*, p. 678
- ⁶ *ibid.*, p. 680
- ⁷ The overseas-born Lebanese data are from the customised matrix of the 2001 Census purchased from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). (They exclude 3763 for whom birthplace was not stated.) Numbers as a proportion of migrants from the Middle East are calculated from the one per cent users' file of the 2001 Census, ABS.
- ⁸ Calculated from customised matrix of the 2001 Census
- ⁹ See Humphrey, *op. cit.*, p. 678.
- ¹⁰ Such data as are available show a high crime rate and a high rate of imprisonment for people born in Lebanon. Indeed these rates are generally exceeded only by those born in Vietnam. In the late 1990s the Lebanon-born imprisonment rate for violent offences was the highest of all birthplace groupings. See S. Mukherjee, *Ethnicity and Crime: An Australian Research Study*, Australian Institute of Criminology, 1999 <<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/ethnicity-crime/>>, pp. 51, 87-88, 93-94. See also T. Priest, 'The rise of Middle Eastern crime in Australia', *Quadrant*, vol. XLVIII, no. 1-2, 2004, pp. 9-16; and P. Carlyon and J. Lyons, 'Cops, Lebs and the new civil war', *The Bulletin*, 2006, 7 February, pp. 15-21.
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- ²⁰ J. Wakim, 'A police disservice to paint race relations with broad-brush labels', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2006, 1 February, p. 15; Tadros, 2005, *op. cit.*
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- ²³ R. Wright, 'Lebanon', in *ibid.*, p. 58
- ²⁴ See for example P. McDonald, *Community Profiles 1996 Census: Lebanon Born*, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Canberra, 2000.
- ²⁵ N. O'Brien and R. Kerbaj, 'A complex cultural divide', *The Australian*, 2005, 15 December, pp. 1, 4

- ²⁶ N. O'Brien and E. Wynhausen, 'Where Santa meets hijab, faiths clash', *The Australian*, 2003, 13 December, pp. 1, 12
- ²⁷ That is, who gave their first response to the question 'What is this person's ancestry?' as Lebanese. (Respondents were told that they could give two or more answers. Only 6.5 per cent of Muslims gave more than one ancestry.)
- ²⁸ Just over eight per cent of Muslims in the 2001 Census gave their first ancestry as Australian, New Zealand, or European and their birthplace as also being in these countries or regions. (This figure excludes ancestries coded 32, except for sub-code 3205 Greek, and thus excludes Bosnians.) Presumably most of this eight per cent would be converts. Data calculated from the one per cent users' file.
- ²⁹ This growth was most rapid between 1971 and 1981 when the average annual rate was 13.15 per cent, compared to 1981 to 2001 (average annual rate 6.74 per cent).
- ³⁰ B. Cleland, 'The history of Muslims in Australia', in A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh (Eds), *Muslim Communities in Australia*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2001, p. 26
- ³¹ Calculated from the one per cent users' file of the 2001 Census
- ³² Data for 1959 to 1998, *Overseas Arrivals and Departures*, ABS, Cat. no. 4304.0 (various issues) and *Australian Demographic Statistics*, ABS, Cat. no. 3101.0 (various issues); data from 1999 to 2005 are unpublished and provided by the ABS.
- ³³ At the 2001 census, 43 per cent of people who said that their ancestry was Middle Eastern or North African were Christian and 42 per cent were Muslim (and of this latter group 48 per cent said that their ancestry was Lebanese). The Christian/Muslim balance from the region may be changing: Middle Easterners who arrived in Australia between 1996 and 2001 were 35 per cent Christian and 43 per cent Muslim. Data derived from the one per cent users' file of the 2001 Census.
- ³⁴ Data source: customised matrix of the 2001 Census purchased from the ABS
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- ³⁶ *ibid.*
- ³⁷ G. Carmichael and P. McDonald, 'Fertility trends and differentials', S.-E. Khoo and P. McDonald (Eds), *The Transformation of Australia's Population: 1970-2030*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2003, pp. 61-62, 66
- ³⁸ See for example McDonald, 2000, *op. cit.*
- ³⁹ On the possibility of self segregation see W. Omar and K. Allen, *The Muslims in Australia*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1996, p. 47. Edmund Tadros writes of Lebanese Muslims in Sydney that, 'An isolationist message is often reinforced at home and, once an attitude of rebellion takes root, it can spiral out of control'. See 'Years of rejection erupted in open rebellion', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2005, 17 December, p. 7. John Stone argues: 'the fact is that Islam is an exclusive culture, not an inclusive one'. See 'Some will not integrate', *The Australian*, 2005, 18 November, p. 17.
- ⁴⁰ The CPUR bought a customised 2001 Census data set to identify the location of men and women of Lebanese ancestry in Sydney and to explore their socio-economic circumstances. Ancestry rather than country of birth was selected so as to capture both the first and subsequent generations of Lebanese. Religious affiliation was included to distinguish Christian and Muslim Lebanese. Five age groups were specified to enable an examination of persons of prime working age. Year of arrival was included to control for time of arrival in Australia and to identify second (and subsequent) generation Lebanese. Second (and subsequent) generation Lebanese are classified as 'not applicable' under year of arrival. Two measures were specified to enable a comparative insight into socio-economic circumstances: highest non-school qualification and labour-force status.
- ⁴¹ The area we have named Parramatta fringe includes parts of the Holroyd and Auburn Statistical Local Areas (SLAs), Rockdale includes parts of the Canterbury and Marrickville SLAs, Ryde includes parts of Parramatta SLA, and Bankstown (core and fringe) includes much of Canterbury SLA.
- ⁴² We are discounting here the index of dissimilarity.
- ⁴³ E. Healy and B. Birrell, 'Metropolis divided: the political dynamic of spatial inequality and migrant settlement in Sydney', *People and Place*, vol. 11, no. 2, 2003, pp. 65-87
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- ⁴⁵ See E. Healy, '“Disability” or “disadvantage”: spatial variation in the disability support pension recipient rate 1996-2001', *People and Place*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2002, pp. 68-82.
- ⁴⁶ The breakdown was: Lebanese Muslims, 12.7 per cent unemployed, 34.1 per cent not in the workforce; Lebanese Christians, 6.6 per cent unemployed, 21.7 per cent not in the workforce; all men, 5.4 per cent unemployed, 15.3 per cent not in the workforce. Calculated from the customised matrix of the 2001 Census.