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**Immigration and public opinion in Australia: how
public concerns about high migration are
suppressed**

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Executive summary

Australia's remarkable population growth over the last decade is mainly being driven by high levels of immigration. The survey taken by the Australian Population Research Institute (Tapri) in August 2017 found that 54 per cent of voters wanted these levels reduced. But there is some division here. Sixty-one per cent of voters who are not university graduates wanted a reduction but only 41 per cent of graduates agreed.

Data from the 2016 Australian Election Study (AES) collected after the July 2016 federal election show that 72 per cent of people working in arts and media actually wanted a further increase in immigration, as did 49 per cent of teachers and academics. In contrast, those business managers who are not graduates were the keenest on a reduction.

The AES data also reveals an even more striking finding. Sixty per cent of the candidates standing for election in 2016 wanted an increase in migration and only four per cent wanted a decrease.

This position was especially marked for Labor and Greens candidates.

At that time 67 per cent of Labor candidates wanted an increase compared to only 31 per cent of Labor voters. Labor candidates were much closer to Greens candidates and to Greens voters than they were to their own supporters.

On the immigration question politicians live in an attitudinal world remote from the average voter.

Over a year later in 2017 Tapri found that 74 per cent of voters thought Australia did not need more people and that 54 per cent wanted a reduction in immigration. But adverse public opinion has had little impact on policy. There are two reasons for this: political pressures on policy makers applied by the growth lobby, Treasury and the Reserve Bank, and social pressures generated by cultural progressives (most of them university graduates). It is they who promote, and monitor, the doctrine that opposition to high migration is racist.

The Tapri survey documents this, finding that nearly two thirds of voters think that people who question high migration are sometimes thought of as racists. Thirty-one per cent of this group say that this is because such sceptics usually are racists (an opinion endorsed by 41 per cent of graduates). Sixty-nine per cent of this sub-group say that the accusation is unfair 'because very few of them are racists', a proportion rising to 75 per cent among non-graduates.

These results are used to construct a free-speech-on-immigration variable. This consists of four categories: the 'guardians against racism' (those who said sceptics usually were racist); the 'threatened' (those who said the accusation was unfair); the 'fearless' (those who said sceptics were *not* 'sometimes thought of as racist'); and the 'confused' (those who said 'don't know').

Graduates predominate among the guardians. Twenty-six per cent of graduates took the strong moral position that questioning high migration was usually a manifestation of racism. Not surprisingly, graduates who are guardians against racism are much more likely to want an increase in migration than are the threatened or indeed the sample as a whole.

A further question found that people who were threatened by possible accusations of racism were less likely to speak out about immigration, especially if they were graduates. As for the confused, 45 per cent said they didn't know enough about immigration to discuss it.


Many voters are either silenced by the threat posed by the guardians or too confused to take an active part in public debate. If the two categories of threatened (45 per cent) and confused (10 per cent) are added, 55 per cent of voters may be deterred from entering into any debate on immigration.

The guardians are right to take a strong stand against racism but wrong to see it where none exists. The problem lies in the moral reflex that equates discontent about high migration with racism. The silence this promotes does more than inhibit democratic reform, it gives comfort to the growth lobby. This profits from immigration while leaving the silenced majority to pay the costs.

Immigration and public opinion in Australia: how voters' concerns about high migration are sidelined and suppressed

Over the past decade Australia's population growth has been exceptionally high, largely fuelled by immigration (see Figure 1).¹ Cities are growing rapidly, especially Melbourne and Sydney where a majority of migrants settle.² Infrastructure Australia reports that Sydney is now projected to grow from 4.7 million in 2016 to just over 7.3 million in 2046 and Melbourne from 4.5 million to just under 7.3 million.³ Unless immigration is reduced 7.3 million in 2046 for each city will be merely a way station on a journey to ever higher numbers.

Figure 1: Australia, annual population growth, June 1972 to June 2017, '000s



Sources: 1972 to 1981, ABS 3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2014, Table 1.3, 1981 to 2017, ABS 3101.0 Australian Demographic Statistics Table 1. Population Change, Summary — Australia

Note: NOM stands for net overseas migration

Population growth has its champions but, until recently, very few public critics and no effective political opposition. As the data presented below show, this is not for want of adverse public opinion. So why the dearth of challengers?

Why growth persists

All questions about the costs and benefits of immigration-fuelled growth aside, there are two immediate reasons for its size and persistence. The first is political.

The growth lobby

High migration has strong support from the business interests that profit from it⁴ and, within government, from Treasury⁵ and now the Reserve Bank.⁶ This focused advocacy enjoys bipartisan support from both the Liberal/National Coalition government and the Labor opposition. Bipartisanship means that the costs of population growth are not

usually debated in Parliament and that neither government nor opposition has any political motive to produce an explicit population policy. Such a policy could well form the basis of a public debate which neither grouping would enjoy. Rather they maintain their silence, and the mainstream media, seeing nothing to report, have helped them to preserve it.⁷ Labor, and The Greens, also have a graduate constituency that is more pro-high migration than not.⁸

Even though 74 per cent of voters say Australia does not need more people,⁹ bipartisanship and silence mean that there has been little political discussion about the causes and effects of population growth. The political class advocates for it but is silent on its costs. A few independent commentators have recently shown their awareness of this. Indeed Judith Sloan, contributing economics editor at *The Australian*, describes their one-sided advocacy as a conspiracy.¹⁰

The progressive class

And then there is the influence of the progressive class, the left-leaning well-educated intellectuals whom Thomas Piketty refers to as Brahmins.¹¹ As in the United States progressives have been setting the cultural agenda on affirmative action, diversity, social justice programs in schools, and a welcoming stance on immigration.¹² They tend to be cosmopolitans who have clear ideas on what may and may not be said on questions concerning race which, for many of them, includes immigration. For example when Peter Dutton drew attention to links between a handful of second-generation Lebanese Muslim migrants and terrorism¹³ he was roundly condemned as a racist bigot.¹⁴ ‘The progressive view is that such issues cannot be raised’.¹⁵

Previous research has shown that people who support silence on the costs of growth are concentrated among cultural progressives. It is they who are most likely to see questions about the value of immigration-fuelled growth as signs of xenophobia,¹⁶ to conflate support for immigration with an open borders approach to asylum seekers,¹⁷ and to argue that ‘because there are many desperate to hate – [the subject of immigration] must be treated with extreme care by politicians and journalists’.¹⁸ Most tend to think that criticism of immigration, including immigration-fuelled population growth, is racist.¹⁹

Many progressives can be found among the growing new class of university graduates,²⁰ their attitudes formed within a campus ethos valuing cosmopolitanism, a delight in diversity and a preference for half-open borders, wide-open to asylum seekers — the latter a political value of high symbolic value to those who hold it.²¹


The old distinctions between left and right based on economic redistribution have been smudged or erased. New ones based on social and cultural questions have eased into their place. Now to be ‘left-wing’ is to take progressive positions on questions such as indigenous rights, cultural diversity and asylum seekers.²² Many are active in the serious media and in academia. From these positions they act as ‘thought leaders’²³ in public debate.

In contrast, people who are sceptical about immigration tend to value the protection provided by national belonging.²⁴ They are localist in outlook, less likely to be highly educated, more likely to be instinctive patriots, and more likely to see undocumented asylum seekers as invaders rather than as objects of compassion. These attributes are handicaps. Lack of education plus unfashionable commitments to the nation mean that immigration sceptics can find it hard to express themselves in words acceptable to progressives.

Attitudes to immigration, the 2016 Australian Election Study (AES): graduates and non-graduates

Data on voters' attitudes to immigration in the 2016 Australian Election Study (AES) show a marked gap between different occupational groups. This gap is especially strong with occupations filled by graduates as compared to those filled by non-graduates..

Figure 2: Immigration should be 'reduced a little or a lot' or 'increased a little or a lot' by occupation and education, 2016 AES survey, voters %



Source: 2016 Australian Election Study (AES), voters, see Table A.1 in Appendix 1

Figure 2 shows attitudes to immigration in the 2016 AES voters' file by occupation and graduate status.²⁵ All of the professionals and managers shown here have, with one exception, been analysed according to their graduate status. (There are some graduates in the other occupational categories but their numbers are small and, if shown, would have made the graph too detailed to be useful.)

The exception concerns arts and media professionals. There are but 24 of them in the sample: 12 graduates and 12 non-graduates. They are grouped together because of their small numbers. Even though they comprise only 24 individuals the feelings of this group are different enough from the rest, and strong enough, to be significant at the .01 level. (This means that the probability of the difference between them and the sample as a whole being due to chance alone is less than one in a hundred.) Their ranks include journalists, media producers and presenters, film, television, radio and stage directors, authors, and book and script editors.²⁶ And despite Australia's massive population growth, nearly three quarters of them want the migrant intake to be set even higher.

Arts and media professionals are in a strong position either to foster debate or to ignore it; they can be thought leaders for the nation or its de facto censors. The data shown in Figure 2 suggest that many would be tempted to use their media stewardship to sideline any criticism of immigration-fuelled growth.

The occupational category next most favourable to increased immigration are graduate professionals working in education as teachers and academics. This is another group likely to contain many thought leaders. The category of graduate professionals least enthusiastic about immigration is the one including legal, welfare and health professionals. Members of this group may be more likely to come up against the problems exacerbated by growth than, for example, academics or arts and media professionals.


Managers are split on the question. Managers who are graduates are much more in favour of an increase than are non-graduate managers. This is not surprising given that the former have been exposed to the progressive value set dominant in Australia's universities. But the AES data also show that the two groups differ by income and employment sector. Non-graduate managers have a lower annual household income: 27 per cent are on more than \$140,000 a year, as opposed to 48 per cent of graduate managers. And compared to graduate managers, the non-graduates are twice as likely to be self-employed, and only half as likely to work in the public sector. (See Tables A.8 and A.9 in Appendix 1.)

The most striking overall finding in Figure 2 is that graduates are much more likely to want an increase in immigration than a reduction. In contrast, non-graduates are much more likely to want the reverse.

Attitudes to immigration, the 2016 AES: voters and candidates

Figure 3 is also drawn from the 2016 Australian Election Study (AES) but this time it includes candidates as well as voters.²⁷ It contrasts voters' attitudes to immigration with those of the men and women who hoped to represent them. (The candidates were drawn from the four main parties: Labor, Liberal, National and Greens. Liberals and Nationals have been grouped together here as the Coalition.)

Figure 3: ‘The number of migrants allowed into Australia at the present time has’—
(%)



Source: Australian Election Study (AES), candidates and voters, 2016. See Table A.2 in Appendix 1.

This shows that voters who are dissatisfied with the effect of population growth on their quality of life are unlikely to find ready champions in parliament. The views of election candidates are quite unlike those of all voters, and especially unlike those of non-graduates. Sixty per cent of election candidates are not only happy with things as they are, they want even more immigration, while only six per cent share the views of the many non-graduates (49 per cent) who want less.

When the data are arranged by the party people voted for in the House of Representatives, and the candidates standing for that party, it is clear that there is a wide difference between the views of Labor voters and Labor candidates.


Figure 4 shows that more than twice as many Labor candidates wanted an increase in immigration as did Labor voters. Thirty-three per cent of Labor voters wanted a decrease compared with just two per cent of Labor candidates

As Figure 4 makes clear, with the exception of the Greens, voters for the two major party groupings, and for the array of minor parties (grouped as ‘other parties’), are disenchanted with high migration. The gap between most voters and almost all candidates on this question is large.

Labor candidates hold views that were nearly identical to those of Greens candidates. Their views were also much closer to Greens voters than to supporters of their own party.

Figure 4 also shows that people who said that they had voted for one of the minor parties (more than 18 per cent of the sample) were even more dissatisfied with high migration than were supporters of the four main parties.

Figure 4: ‘The number of migrants allowed into Australia at the present time has’ — by party(%)



Source: Australian Election Study (AES), candidates and voters, 2016. Table A.3 in Appendix 1

Note: Voters are grouped by their first preference vote in the House of Representatives in 2016.

The Coalition consists of the Liberal and National parties, the grouping that has formed the government since 2013.

Why should the candidates be so very different from the voters? The educational background of parliamentarians suggests that they would be likely to support immigration and this may help explain the results shown in Figures 3 and 4. In 2016, 87 per cent of Members of the House of Representatives were university graduates as were 76 per cent of Senators.²⁸ This is a massive increase from a mere 15 per cent in 1901 and a modest 40 per cent in 1980.²⁹

This shift does not, however, prepare us for the overwhelming gulf between candidates and voters shown in Figure 3. Selection effects, an in-group culture remote from the average voter, well-heeled lobbyists and a co-dependent relationship with media elites all contribute to creating an insider class of politicians and their close associates. On the immigration question they live in a world remote from that of the average voter.

Public debate, public opinion, and silence

While the first reason for the persistence of high migration is political, the second is social. Beyond the confines of the insider class lies the broader progressive graduate class where strong norms support ongoing immigration. But norms do not stand alone; they are buttressed by ignorance. In late 2015 a survey conducted by Sustainable Population Australia found that most voters knew very little about the dynamics of population growth, an ignorance shared by most graduates.³⁰

The American scholar, Gary Freeman, argues that voters are ignorant about immigration because public debate is constrained, reliable data are hard to find and, absent explanation, hard to interpret.³¹

Freeman also asserts that scholars too, even if they tend towards mild scepticism, may judge it prudent to steer clear of topics which could signal this tendency, topics such as the nexus between demography and the environment.³² Added to this there is information stewardship in the media where ‘Journalists decide the acceptable limits of public discourse and those who veer outside these bounds are ignored or attacked until they are removed or resign’.³³

The costs of discovering information about immigration and its demographic consequences are high and those who search for it too industriously may court the stigma of racism. Besides, rather than enabling the spread of information, the government hides it. For example, as Judith Sloan points out, the planned immigration numbers were not even mentioned in the 2017-18 budget papers.³⁴

However, recently, as some of the effects of growth have become even more pressing, a handful of independent commentators have spoken, not just of a conspiracy or a clash of values, but of a general taboo on questioning high migration.³⁵ Are they right? Does the stigma attached to harbouring doubts amount to a taboo?

Anecdotal evidence suggests it may. For example, an environmentalist trying to persuade an ABC team to mention the effects of population growth was told: ‘You’re trying to get us to break a whole set of small-l liberal non-nos’.³⁶ This was one of the more polite shut-downs; other would-be censors don’t hesitate to label such questions as racist.³⁷ If the new commentators are right, an uneasy silence could mean that popular discomfort with deteriorating quality of life may not translate readily into political action.

Attitudes to immigration and beliefs about racism

The data collected by the Tapri survey shed light on the existence of a taboo. Question 20 asked ‘Do you think that people who raise questions about immigration being too high are sometimes thought of as racist?’ Nearly two thirds of Australian voters said ‘yes’, people who question high migration are ‘sometimes thought of as racist’.

Table 1: (Q20) ‘Do think that people who raise questions about immigration being too high are sometimes thought of as racist?’ by graduate/non-graduate status %

Q20	Graduate	Non-graduate	Total
Yes	63	66	65
No	26	25	26
Don’t know	11	9	10
Total %	100	100	100
Total N	777	1290	2067

Note: The questions from the Tapri survey analysed in this paper are included in Appendix 2, as is a note on the survey’s method.

But do they think the assumption of racism is warranted? Question 20 was followed by another (asked only of those who had said ‘yes’). Was the assumption made because such people ‘usually are racist’, or was it ‘unfair because very few of them are racist’?

Table 2 shows that just under a third of those who had said ‘yes’ thought the assumption warranted while over two third thought it unfair. However 41 per cent of graduates thought it warranted: in this sub-group close to half of the graduates thought that people who questioned high migration were racists. In contrast, 75 per cent of the non-graduates thought the accusation of racism was unfair.

Table 2: Question 21, following from Q 20 (for those who said ‘yes’), perceptions of why sceptics are ‘sometimes thought of as racist’, by graduate/non-graduate status %

Q21 ‘This is—’	Graduate	Non-graduate	Total
‘Because they usually are racist’	*41	*25	31
‘Unfair because very few of them are racist’	59	*75	69
Total %	100	100	100
Total N (of those who said ‘yes’)	488	846	1334

*The difference between the sub group and the total of those who said ‘yes’ to Question 20 is significant at the .05 level.

These two questions were used to construct the ‘free speech variable’ set out in Table 3. This measures effective free speech as far as immigration, and thus population growth, are concerned.

Voters who said ‘yes’ to question 20 and who then went on to say that this is ‘because they usually are racists’ are termed the ‘guardians against racism’. They are likely to feel morally repelled by people who raise the subject, the people who they believe ‘usually are racist’.

In turn, immigration sceptics who are aware of this may feel threatened by the prospect of this repulsion. This is the group who found the assumption of racism unfair. Here they are termed ‘threatened’. And what of those who said ‘no’, the voters who believe that sceptics are *not* usually thought of as racist? Here they are termed the ‘fearless’ while those who simply said they didn’t know are the ‘confused’. How many respondents are there in each of the categories used to construct the free-speech variable?


Table 3 shows that overall one fifth can be counted as guardians against racism (and more than a quarter of graduates). In contrast nearly half the sample may feel threatened by this attitude (a proportion much higher among non-graduates, but still relatively high among graduates). The other two categories, the ‘fearless’ and the ‘confused’, show little difference by graduate status. Figure 5 illustrates the patterns shown in Table 3.

Table 3: The free speech variable, by graduate/non-graduate status %

	Graduate	Non-graduate	Total	Comment
Guardians against racism	*26	16	20	Yes to Q20 and 'usually are racist' to Q21
Threatened	**37	*49	45	Yes to Q20 and 'unfair' to Q21
Fearless	26	25	26	No to Q20
Confused	11	9	10	Don't know to Q20
Total	100	100	100	
Total N	778	1290	2067	

*The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .05 level.

**The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

Figure 5: The free speech variable, graduates and non-graduates %


Source: Table 3 above

In all 26 per cent of graduates took the strong moral position that questioning high migration was usually a manifestations of racism, a position that fits well with the value set of most progressives.

But does believing that people may be unfairly called racist for questioning high migration mean that the threatened are themselves deterred from questioning it? All respondents were asked the next question (question 22): 'Have you yourself ever felt uncomfortable about raising questions about immigration, for example with friends or workmates?' There were five response categories including: 'Yes, people can get the wrong idea about you if you do'.

Figure 6 shows that if voters believe the risk is there they are likely to be deterred by it. Respondents in the threatened category are much more likely to say 'Yes, people can get the wrong idea about if you do' than are the guardians against racism.

Figure 6: Question 22: ‘Have you yourself ever felt uncomfortable raising questions about immigration?’ – Response ‘Yes, people can get the wrong idea about you if you do’ by the free-speech variable and graduate/non-graduate status %




Source: Table A.4 in Appendix 1

Voters who are threatened by the risk of being accused of racism are much more likely to say that people can get the wrong idea about you if you question high migration. This is especially true if they are university graduates. Fewer graduates feel threatened (Figure 5), but of those who do a higher proportion are reluctant to speak their minds.

Figure 7 shows that the threatened are less likely to want an increase in immigration and that this is accentuated for non-graduates. It also shows that graduates who are guardians against racism are much more likely to want an increase than are the threatened, or indeed the sample as a whole. Figure 8 shows that guardians are also much less likely to want a reduction. It also shows that, among non-graduates who feel threatened by the accusation of racism, 75 per want a reduction in the intake. While graduates who are threatened are more likely to be chary of speaking out, it is the non-graduates who are threatened who most ardently desire a reduction in immigration.


A majority of voters who are threatened want a decrease in immigration, but they are unlikely to talk about this. Fear of disapproval may even inhibit their answers to survey researchers if the research method employed means talking to an actual person (rather than filling in an anonymous questionnaire).

Figure 7: Immigration should be ‘increased a little or a lot’, guardians against racism and the threatened by graduate/non-graduate status %



Sources: Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 in Appendix 1

Figure 8: Immigration should be ‘reduced a little or a lot’, guardians against racism and the threatened by graduate/non-graduate status %



Sources: Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 in Appendix 1

These findings confirm the supposition that progressive values are especially strong among the graduate class. These values predispose many of the guardians to condemn immigration sceptics and lead a relatively high proportion of them to support increases in the migrant intake. In contrast few of the threatened want an increase, especially those who are not graduates. But Figure 8 also shows that many graduates are among the large group who both feel threatened and who want a reduction in the intake.

Despite their communication skills, graduates who are sceptics may find it harder than non-graduates to raise questions about immigration because their ‘friends and workmates’ are likely to be progressives, some of them quick to condemn sceptics and exclude them.³⁸ Graduates who are sceptics have more resources with which to make their case but can run higher personal risks in doing so.

Some time ago Mark Lopez suggested that as well as talking of a ‘chattering class’ among the intelligentsia we should also talk of a ‘whispering class’,³⁹ a sub-group who, though unhappy with continual growth, are wary of coming out. But if they should chance upon a kindred spirit they are relieved to be able to share their discontents in the safe space of the sotto voce.

Taken together these findings mean that there is a large constituency for a reduction in the migrant intake. Indeed since the Tapri survey was run two more polls have confirmed this: in April 2018 a News Poll found that 56 per cent of voters thought immigration was too high⁴⁰ and, in the same month, Essential Research found that 64 per cent of voters thought that ‘immigration over the last 10 years’ had been too high.⁴¹

Finding a voice

Strong divisions exist within the Australian electorate on the question of immigration-fuelled population growth (and an even stronger division between that electorate and candidates for office). A large part of the difference between groups may be explained by differences in the degree to which voters are impacted by the pressures of growth, and also by differences in the cultural milieu which shape their ideas and support, or threaten, them. This paper documents these divisions and draws on survey data to help explain the continuing silence on the costs of growth.

The Tapri survey shows that a substantial majority of voters are aware of the taboo on questioning high immigration. Some of them (the guardians against racism) endorse it, but many are threatened by it. Twenty-seven per cent say they would feel uncomfortable discussing immigration because ‘people can get the wrong idea about you if do’ while a further 17 per cent say they ‘don’t know enough about immigration to discuss it’. This means that 44 per cent of voters are unwilling or unable to participate in a debate either from fear or ignorance.

Twenty seven per cent say either that they are ‘okay with things as they are’ or are ‘happy to speak in favour to it’, leaving only 29 per cent ‘happy to speak against it, even if others don’t agree’.

Many voters feel intimidated by the taboo but, if all of the threatened are combined with all of the confused, 55 per cent of the electorate is at risk of being silenced or sidelined. While non-graduates predominate among this sidelined category, it also includes many graduates, people who would like to see the number of immigrants reduced but are fearful of speaking out.

Bipartisanship and pro-immigration opinion leaders in the media provide few openings for dissent. Silence, fortified by rebuke, keeps the question of a national population policy off the agenda. Douglas Murray writes:

In Europe the political class knows that it has done mass immigration against the will of its public. Partly as a result, politicians have done everything they can to disable the public's response mechanisms.⁴²

The same may be true of Australia. The political forces smothering debate have been strong. Dick Smith has made a serious effort to challenge them, as have the Sustainable Australia Party and Sustainable Population Australia. But it is hard to make headway against the political class with its blanket of silence. The power of this morally charged silence is strong. For example, the premier of NSW (Gladys Berejiklian) fears to raise the topic because doing so ‘may look like racism on her part’,⁴³ and members of the public can say ‘you are likely to get hounded out of your job if you have temerity to attempt to talk about population policy in Australia’.⁴⁴

Yet the Tapri survey shows that there is substantial disquiet, and not only among the less well-educated. Many graduates are unhappy. But why have they done so little about it? The answer lies in the clear finding that asking questions and talking about population policy court moral disapproval (especially within graduate circles).

Taking a strong stand against racism is a core principle in the progressive identity. And rightly so. The problem lies in the ill-informed reflex that automatically equates discontent with high migration with the racism that progressives deplore.

This reflex silences many potential critics and, as far as graduate sceptics are concerned, carries with it not just the risk of public opprobrium but the risk of exclusion from social groups that are dear to them. It also gives the growth lobby a licence to enjoy the benefits its narrow constituency gains from population growth while at the same time claiming to be on the side of virtue.

Murray says that we have ‘disabled our ability to have a sane public discussion’ and a sane discussion free from slurs and derision is what we need. Voters need an explicit population policy with accessible information. They also need responsive politicians.

For the time being the only vehicles for their discontent are the Sustainable Australia Party, or One Nation, or possibly the Australian Conservatives. These parties are small and, while they have an impact at the margins, especially One Nation, they are in no position to win government in the near future. The situation is different for the major parties which, if one of them chose to respond to the majority of voters, would be in a winning position.

*Immigration and public opinion***Appendix 1 Tables****Table A.1:** ‘Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased?’ by occupation and education, Australian Election Study 2016, voters %

<i>The number of immigrations should be:—</i>	Increased a little or a lot	Remain about the same as it is	Reduced a little or a lot	Total %	Total N
1 Arts & media professionals, both graduates and non-graduates	**72	16	**12	100	24
<i>Graduates</i>					
2 Education graduates	**49	31	**20	100	130
3 ICT, design, Engineering, science & transport graduates	**47	35	**18	100	97
4 Legal, social and welfare, business, HR, marketing, & health graduates	*34	38	**28	100	265
5 Managers who are graduates	**42	35	**22	100	193
<i>Non-graduates</i>					
6 Non-graduate professionals	30	32	38	100	164
7 Non-graduate managers	**15	28	**56	100	227
8 Community, personal services, clerical, administrative, & Sales workers	25	33	42	100	721
9 Technicians & trades workers, machinery operators, drivers, & labourers	**14	31	**55	100	510
Total sample	26	32	42	100	2683

*The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .05 level.

** The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

Source: The 2016 Australian Election Study, voters, data file. Ian McAllister et al.

www.australianelectionstudy.org/ The authors of this data file are not responsible for my interpretation of it.

Note: 352 respondents who were coded ‘other - insufficiently detailed’, ‘Does not apply’ or ‘Item skipped’ on the occupation variable are not shown here but are included in the total. However 23 who were missing on either education or occupation are excluded from the total.

Table A.2: ‘The number of migrants allowed into Australia at the present time has: gone much too far, too far, is about right, not gone far enough, not gone nearly far enough’, candidates and voters, Australian Election Study, 2016 %

	Candidates	All voters	Graduates	Non-graduates
Gone much too far	1	20	10	26
Gone too far	4	19	13	23
Gone much too far or too far	6	40	24	49
About right	34	38	44	34
Not gone far enough	43	16	25	11
Not gone nearly far enough	17	7	8	6
Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	60	23	33	17
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	141	2640	960	1635

Sources: Australian Election Study, 2016, candidates and voters files, Ian McAllister et al. <www.australianelectionstudy.org/> The authors of these data files are not responsible for my interpretation of them.

Table A.3: ‘The number of migrants allowed into Australia at the present time has’ –
(Australian Election Study 2016) %

	Gone much too far	Gone too far	Gone much too far and gone too far	About right	Not gone far enough	Not gone nearly far enough	Not gone far enough or nearly far enough	Total %	Total N
Labor voters	16	17	33	35	22	9	31	100	819
Labor candidates	0	2	2	31	61	6	67	100	54
Coalition voters	23	25	47	42	9	2	11	100	1001
Coalition candidates	0	22	22	61	17	0	17	100	18
Greens voters	4	4	8	32	37	24	61	100	244
Greens candidates	3	1	4	29	36	30	66	100	69
Voters for other parties	33	21	54	36	8	1	10	100	467
Total voters	21	20	40	38	16	6	22	100	2531
Total candidates	1	4	5	34	43	17	60	100	141

Sources: Australian Election Study, 2016, candidates and voters files. See note of attribution and disclaimer at Table A.2

Note: Thirty-seven candidates were missing on the immigration question.

Also the number of candidates for the Coalition parties (Liberal, n=13, and National, n=5) is small and, despite the fact that they are closer to their voters than are Labor candidates to their voters, this finding cannot be relied on.

Table A.4: The free speech variable and graduate/non-graduate status by Q22 ‘Have you yourself ever felt uncomfortable about raising questions about immigration, for example with friends or workmates?’ %

	Yes, people can get the wrong idea about you if you do	I haven't wanted to question it; I'm okay with things as they are	I'm happy to speak against it, even if others don't agree	I'm happy to speak in favour of it, even if others don't agree	I don't know enough about immigration to discuss it	<i>Okay plus in favour</i>	Total %	Total N
Guardian (grad)	24	*22	**12	**32	*11	**54	100	199
Guardian (non-grad)	23	15	**12	**32	18	**47	100	211
Threatened (grad)	**42	11	29	*9	**8	20	100	288
Threatened (non-grad)	**36	**6	33	**8	17	**15	100	635
Fearless (grad)	*19	**24	36	12	**9	*36	100	204
Fearless (non-grad)	**16	10	**47	*9	18	*18	100	325
Confused (grad)	**8	19	*16	15	**41	34	100	85
Confused (non-grad)	**8	18	**15	12	**47	30	100	118
Total Graduates	28	*18	25	16	*13	*35	100	776
Total non-graduates	26	*10	31	13	*20	*22	100	1289
Total sample	27	13	29	14	17	27	100	2066

** The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

* The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

Table A.5: Attitudes to immigration by the free speech variable %

Q5 The number of immigrants should be...	Guardian against racism	Threatened	Fearless	Confused	Total
Increased a lot	**15	**3	*5	6	6
Increased a little	**25	**6	8	13	11
Increased a lot or a little	**40	**8	*14	19	17
Remain about the same as it is	**40	**23	25	**50	29
Reduced a little	**10	**26	22	15	21
Reduced a lot	**10	**43	*40	17	33
Reduced a little or a lot	**20	**69	*62	31	54
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	413	922	531	204	2070

*The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .05 level.

** The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

Table A.6: Attitudes to immigration by the free speech variable, graduates only %

Q5 The number of immigrants should be...	Guardian against racism	Threatened	Fearless	Confused	Total graduates	Total sample
Increased a lot	**	3	6	8	8	6
Increased a little	**27	9	13	16	15	11
Increased a lot or a little	**46	12	19	24	24	17
Remain about the same as it is	*38	30	31	**53	35	29
Reduced a little	**10	25	20	15	19	21
Reduced a lot	**5	33	30	**7	22	33
Reduced a little or a lot	**16	58	50	**22	**41	54
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	201	288	205	86	780	2067

*The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .05 level.

** The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

Table A.7: Attitudes to immigration by the free speech variable, non-graduates only %

Q5 The number of immigrants should be...	Guardian against racism	Threatened	Fearless	Confused	Total non-graduates	Total sample
Increased a lot	*12	*3	5	4	5	6
Increased a little	**23	**4	*6	10	8	11
Increased a lot or a little	**35	**7	*10	14	13	17
Remain about the same as it is	*42	**19	**21	**47	26	29
Reduced a little	**9	*27	23	14	22	21
Reduced a lot	**14	**47	**46	24	*39	33
Reduced a little or a lot	**23	**74	**69	*38	**61	54
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	212	634	326	118	1290	2067

*The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .05 level.

** The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level

Table A.8: Household income by occupation and education, Australian Election Study 2016, voters %

<i>Occupation</i>	Less than \$40,001	\$40,001 to \$80,000	\$80,001 to \$140,000	More than \$140,001	Total %	Total N
1 Arts & media professionals grad & non-grad	22	39	13	26	100	23
2 Education graduates	9	27	30	35	100	124
3 ICT, design, Engineering, science & transport graduates	4	13	45	38	100	93
4 Legal, social and welfare, business, HR, marketing, & health graduates	8	18	35	39	100	261
5 Managers who are graduates	5	16	31	48	100	186
6 Non-graduate professionals	20	34	26	20	100	160
7 Non-graduate managers	19	30	24	27	100	216
8 Community, personal services, clerical, administrative, & Sales workers	28	32	25	14	100	691
9 Technicians & trades workers, Machinery operators, drivers, & labourers	36	30	23	11	100	486
Total sample	26	27	26	21	100	2540

Source: Australian Election Study, voters, 2016, data file Ian McAllister et al. See note and disclaimer at Table A.1.

Note: 161 respondents who were missing on income are excluded from the analysis; 109 respondents missing on occupation, 105 'does not apply' and 86 'insufficiently described' are not analysed separately but are included in the total.

Table A.9: Employment sector by occupation and education, 2016 Australian Election Study, voters %

<i>Occupation</i>	Self-employed	Employee in private company or business	Employee of Federal / State / Local Govt	Employee in family business or farm	Total %	Total N
1 Arts & media professionals grad & non-grad	50	50	0	0	100	24
2 Education graduates	5	43	52	0	100	124
3 ICT, design, Engineering, science & transport graduates	7	78	14	0	100	97
4 Legal, social and welfare, business, HR, marketing, & health graduates	14	48	38	0	100	262
5 Managers who are graduates	16	53	30	2	100	192
6 Non-graduate professionals	12	50	37	1	100	159
7 Non-graduate managers	34	49	14	3	100	225
8 Community, personal services, clerical, administrative, & Sales workers	7	68	20	5	100	708
9 Technicians & trades workers, Machinery operators, drivers, & labourers	19	63	13	5	100	501
Total sample	15	59	23	3	100	2415

Source: Australian Election Study, voters, 2016, data file, see note and disclaimer at Table A.1.

Note: 291 respondents missing on employment sector (ie 'whom do (or did) you work for') are excluded from the analysis; 123 respondents insufficiently detailed or missing on occupation or education are not analysed separately but are included in the total.

Table A.10: ‘Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased?’ by vote in the House of Representatives 2016 and graduate/non-graduate status, Australian Election Study, 2016 %

	Increased a little or a lot	Remain about the same as it is	Reduced a little or a lot	Total %	Total N
Grad. Liberal	24	**43	*32	100	336
Grad. Labor	**50	32	**18	100	302
Grad. Nationals	11	50	39	100	18
Grad. Greens	**72	24	**4	100	137
Grad. Other parties	22	32	46	100	152
<i>Total graduates</i>	<i>**39</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>**26</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>945</i>
Non-grad. Liberal	**15	33	**52	100	571
Non-grad. Labor	23	28	*49	100	520
Non-grad Nationals	**7	34	*59	100	68
Non-grad. Greens	**56	25	**19	100	108
Non-grad. Other parties	**8	28	**64	100	324
<i>Total non-graduates</i>	<i>**18</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>**52</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1591</i>
Total sample	26	32	42	100	2688

* The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .05 level.

** The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

Source: Australian Election Study, 2016, voters, data file. See disclaimer at Table A.1.

Table A.11: All boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back, voters by party and graduate/non-graduate status, and candidates by party %

	Strongly agree & agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree & strongly disagree	Total %	Total N
Labor (graduates)	**17	20	**63	100	301
Labor (non-grads)	46	23	32	100	516
Coalition (graduates)	*56	23	**21	100	352
Coalition (non-grads)	**68	18	**14	100	634
Greens (graduates)	**4	**7	**89	100	136
Greens (non-grads)	**17	*11	**71	100	105
Voters for other parties (graduates)	47	15	38	100	150
Voters for other parties non-grads)	**61	23	**16	100	323
<i>Total graduate voters</i>	<i>**35</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>**47</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>939</i>
<i>Total non-grad voters</i>	<i>**56</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>**24</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1578</i>
All voters	48	20	33	100	2671
<i>Labor candidates</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>53</i>
<i>Coalition candidates</i>	<i>88</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Greens candidates</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>69</i>
All candidates	19	10	71	100	139

*The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .05 level.

** The difference between the sub group and the total is significant at the .01 level.

Sources: AES 2016 voters and candidate' files. See note and disclaimer at Table A.2.

Notes: Tests of significance are not appropriate for the candidates' data as they are not based on a random sample

Eighty-nine voters were missing, either on the party they voted for in 2016 or on their views on asylum seekers by boat. Forty-three candidates are missing on asylum seekers arriving by boat

Appendix 2

Tapri survey method

The survey ran from Monday 31 July 2017 to 17 August 2017. Questions were chosen, and the analysis done, by Tapri: the field work was done online by The Online Research Unit. They collected data from a random national sample of 2067 drawn from an online panel of 300,000 people. The survey was restricted to voters. Quotas were set with a 10% leeway in line with the ABS distribution for age, gender and location, including a boost of a minimum n=100 in NT, ACT and TAS. The final data were then weighted to the actual age, gender, and location distribution according to the ABS Census.

Participants were offered points as token rewards (these could be used to gain access to a cash raffle, or taken as a \$1 payment, or donated to charity). The survey took approximately ten minutes for them to complete.

A note on Internet panel surveys

Internet panel surveys are used increasingly today, partly because the proportion of households with fixed-line phones has decreased. As of December 2014, 29 per cent of Australian adults had no fixed-line telephone at home, so only 71 per cent did have such a phone. There is the further problem that many of the 71 per cent are not prepared to respond to phone surveys. In contrast, as of 2014-15, 86 per cent of households had Internet access.⁴⁵ By 2017 response rates to telephone polls in the United States had sunk to nine per cent.⁴⁶ Industry sources say that in Australia phone surveys using Robo calls have response rates as low as two or three per cent.

Today in Australia, among the major polling companies, only Ipsos and Morgan continue to rely on telephone surveys.⁴⁷ The others have switched to internet panel polling often combined with Robo phone calls. This includes Newspoll which made the change with little fanfare in June 2015.⁴⁸

Critics of Internet panel surveys say that, because they are only partly based on probability sampling, they lack theoretical credibility. Their supporters say that some of them have proved their reliability and validity in practice.⁴⁹ For example YouGov in the UK is dependent on internet panel surveys. It is now well established and has had success in predicting election outcomes.⁵⁰ Essential Research in Australia is fully reliant on random samples drawn from internet panels and has become an accepted part of the political landscape. One test of external validity is the degree to which an internet panel survey matches known characteristics of the population it claims to reflect. In the case of voter support for major parties, the Tapri findings on voting intentions (Coalition 32%, Labor 34%, Greens 9% and One Nation 10%) are not far off from those of current Newspolls. These of course are now also based on internet panels, though supplemented by Robo calls, but are generally regarded as the gold standard in Australian political polling.

Questions from the Tapri survey analysed in this paper

5 Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased?

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) increased a lot | (2) increased a little | (3) remain about the same as it is | (4) reduced a little | (5) reduced a lot |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

15 From December 2005 to December 2016 Australia's population grew from 20.5 million to 24.4 million; 62% of this growth was from net overseas migration.

Do you think Australia needs more people?

- (1) Yes [Go to question 16]
 (2) No [Go to question 17]

20 Do think that people who raise questions about immigration being too high are sometimes thought of as racist?

- (1) Yes [Go to question 21]
 (2) No [Go to question 22]
 (3) Don't know [Go to question 22]

21 This is—

- (1) Because they usually are racist
 (2) Unfair because very few of them are racist

22 Have you yourself ever felt uncomfortable about raising questions about immigration, for example with friends or workmates?

- (1) Yes, people can get the wrong idea about you if you do.
 (2) I haven't wanted to question it; I'm okay with things as they are.
 (3) I'm happy to speak against it, even if others don't agree
 (4) I'm happy to speak in favour of it, even if others don't agree.
 (5) I don't know enough about immigration to discuss it.

Notes

- ¹ The method for calculating NOM changed in 2006. This had the effect of increasing the numbers of net overseas migrants recorded. However the change in method only accounts for annual increases of 19,000 to 25,000. B. Birrell and E. Healy, 'Net overseas migration: why is it so high?', *People and Place*, 18, 2, pp. 56-65 <http://tapri.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/v18n2_7birrellhealy.pdf> From June 2007 to June 2017 the average recorded NOM was 222,400 p.a., compared to an average of 100,100 p. a. between June 1981 and June 2006. Thus the 2007 to 2017 figures show an average increase of 122,300 p.a., far more than could be explained by the change in methodology.
- ² In 2015-16 74 per cent of net overseas migrants settled in either New South Wales or Victoria, which in effect means Sydney or Melbourne. Calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics, *34120DO007_201516 Migration*, Australia 2015-16 (11 October 2017). See also Ben Schneiders and Royce Millar, 'How a booming population is eroding Melburnians' standard of living', *The Age*, 1 July 2017, p. 1; Sean Nicholls, 'We're full, says Sydney', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 October 2017, p. 1; Judith Sloan, 'We're squeezing the life out of our cities', *The Australian*, 8 August 8 2017, p. 12.
- ³ *Future Cities: Planning for our growing population*, Infrastructure Australia, 2018, p. 21
- ⁴ Katharine Betts and Michael Gilding, 'The growth lobby and Australia's immigration policy', *People and Place*, 2006, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 40-52 <http://tapri.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/v14n4_6bettsgilding.pdf>
- ⁵ See Judith Sloan, 'A conspiracy exists to allow high immigration rates', *The Australian*, 24 February 2018, p. 22; Tony Abbott, 'How cheap shots become own goals', *The Australian*, 23 February 2018, p. 4.
- ⁶ Judith Sloan, 'Big-immigration fan club is devoted to growth myths', *The Australian*, 21 November 2017, p. 12
- ⁷ '[I]mmigration and population policy have been taboo topics for far too long', Editorial, 'Mr Abbott's agenda', *The Spectator Australia*, 27 January 2018 p. i
- ⁸ See Table A.10, on attitudes to immigration by vote in the 2016 election, in Appendix 1.
- ⁹ Katharine Betts and Bob Birrell, 'Australian voters' views on immigration policy', The Australian Population Research Institute, Melbourne, 2017 <<http://tapri.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/TAPRI-survey-19-Oct-2017-final-3.pdf>>
- ¹⁰ See Judith Sloan, 'A conspiracy exists to allow high immigration rates', *The Australian*, 24 February 2018, p. 22.
- ¹¹ Thomas Piketty, 'Brahmin left vs merchant right: rising inequality & the changing structure of political conflict (Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017)', World Inequality Database, 2018
- ¹² See Paul Kelly, 'Grievance culture invites a backlash', *The Australian*, 28 January 2017, pp. 15, 17
- ¹³ Peter Dutton said 'The advice I have is that out of the last 33 people who have been charged with terrorist-related offences in this country, 22 of those people are from second and third generation Lebanese-Muslim backgrounds'. <<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-21/peter-dutton-fraser-made-mistake-resettling-lebanese-refugees/8043624>> accessed 28/4/2018
- ¹⁴ See Paul Bongiorno, 'Peter Dutton's racism to the bottom', *The Saturday Paper*, 26 November-2 December 2016, <<https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/opinion/topic/2016/11/26/peter-duttons-racism-the-bottom/14800788004010>> accessed 28/4/2018; Omar Bensaidi, 'Peter Dutton did not appear out of thin air. He represents consistent Australian policy', *The Guardian*, 30 November 2016 <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/30/peter-dutton-did-not-appear-out-of-thin-air-he-represents-consistent-australian-poli>> accessed 28/4/2018; Julia Calixto and Robert Burton-Bradley, "'What Mr Dutton said was racist": Lebanese Muslims outraged over Immigration Minister's comments', SBSNews, 22 November 2016
- ¹⁵ Paul Kelly, 'Grievance politics take root and are set to intensify', *The Australian*, 15 November 2016, pp. 15, 18
- ¹⁶ See Katharine Betts, *The Great Divide: Immigration politics in Australia*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999, pp. 256-266, 283, 290-299, 316-320.

- ¹⁷ The Tapri survey found that 54 per cent of voters who wanted an increase in immigration opposed the government's policy on turning back the boats while 77 per cent of those who wanted a decrease supported the policy. These differences were significant at the .01 level.
- ¹⁸ Greg Jericho, 'It's easier for Tony Abbott to attack migration than admit his own policies are to blame', *The Guardian*, 24 February 2018
- ¹⁹ See David Marr, 'The White Queen: One Nation and the politics of race', *Quarterly Essay*, 2017, 65, pp. 7, 55, 88; Leith Van Onselen, 'Greens shut down population debate', *MacroBusiness*, 30 August 2016
- ²⁰ See Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, Seabury Press, New York, 1979, pp. 19-27; David Goodhart, *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics*, London, 2017, pp.119, 121,150-159, 167, 177 and passim; David Goodhart, *The British Dream: Success and Failures of Post-War Immigration*, Atlantic Books, London, 2013, pp. xxv, 10, 170,199-205, 250-257; J. C. Williams, *White working class: overcoming class cluelessness in America*, Harvard Business Review Press (Kindle edition), Boston Massachusetts, 2017.
- ²¹ This applies especially to graduates who vote Labor or Greens and to the candidates who stand for these parties. See Table A.11 in Appendix 1.
- ²² Katharine Betts, 'People and parliamentarians: the great divide', *People and Place*, 2004, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 64-83; Katharine Betts, 'Boatpeople and public opinion in Australia', *People and Place*, 2001, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 34-48
- ²³ The term 'thought leaders' is taken from Chris Mitchell, 'Matters of national importance deserve a better response', *The Australian*, 22 January 2018, p. 22. His context was the dismissive reaction of some progressives to Melbourne's African crime gangs.
- ²⁴ See Katharine Betts, 'Cosmopolitans and patriots: Australia's cultural divide and attitudes to immigration', *People and Place*, 2005, vol.13, no. 2, pp. 29-40 <http://tapri.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/v13n2_4betts.pdf>; Betts, 2004, op. cit. The split between the highly educated and others in Europe and the UK on questions such as immigration is described in detail in Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille, *Diploma Democracy: The Rise of Political Meritocracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
- ²⁵ Tapri borrowed this question from the Australian Election Study (AES) which has used it in its election studies for many years. The 'immigration has gone too far ...' question shown in Figures 3 and 4 is used here because it was the only immigration question that the AES asked of both voters and candidates in 2016.
- ²⁶ The group consists of 3 actors, dancers and other entertainers, 2 music professionals, 3 visual arts and crafts professionals, 3 artistic directors, and media producers and presenters, 4 authors, and book and script editors, 5 film, television, radio and stage directors, and 5 journalists and other writers.
- ²⁷ Ian McCalister et al., Australian Election Study, candidates and voters files, 2016 <www.australianelectionstudy.org/> The authors of these data files are not responsible for my interpretation of them. The question illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 is different from the one in Figure 2 because the former was only asked of voters and not of candidates.
- ²⁸ Nick Eversed, Ri Lu and Anna Livsey, 'Are you reflected in the new parliament?', *The Guardian, Australia* <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/datablog/ng-interactive/2016/aug/31/are-you-reflected-in-the-new-parliament-diversity-survey-of-australian-politics>> accessed 3 March 2018
- ²⁹ See 'The 43rd Parliament: traits and trends' 2 October 2013 <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/43rdParl#_Toc368474618>
- ³⁰ Katharine Betts, 'Voters' attitudes to population growth in Australia', Results of a survey conducted for Sustainable Population Australia, 2015 (December) <<http://tapri.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SPA-survey-2015-finalV2.pdf>> The survey included four basic questions on Australian demography. Only two per cent of the sample of 1230 were able to answer all four correctly and 13 per cent were not able to answer any.
- ³¹ Gary Freeman, 'Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states', *International Migration*

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- Review*, 1995, 29, 4, pp. 881-901
- ³² Katharine Betts, 'Demographic and social research on the population and environment nexus in Australia: explaining the gap', *Population and Environment*, 2004, 26, 2, pp. 157-172
- ³³ Fergus Hanson, 'Undermine media and say goodbye democracy', *The Australian*, 3 June 2017, p. 20
- ³⁴ Judith Sloan, 'Dutton part of the cynical charade on house prices', *The Australian*, 30 May 2017, p. 12
- ³⁵ Nicholas Stuart, 'We now live in a land of two nations divided by the topic that nobody wants to talk about, immigration', *The Canberra Times*, 15 November, 2017, p. 16; Andrew Bolt, 'Absurd denial of growing pains', *The Herald Sun*, 26 February 2018, p. 13; Gay Alcorn, 'As a citizen of Melbourne, don't I have the right to question immigration?', *The Guardian, Australian edition*, 24 March 2018. See also Peta Credlin, 'It's not racist to be worried about immigration', news.com.au, 17 December 2017; Garry Linnell, 'Is there room for Big Australia?', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 September 2016; Editorial, 'Mr Abbott's agenda', *The Spectator Australia*, 27 January 2018, p. i.
- ³⁶ Ralph Bennett quoted by Mark O'Connor in 'Has Tony Jones finally broken taboo on Australia's population ponzi?' MacroBusiness.com.au 8 March 2018
- ³⁷ See Malcolm King, 'Rise of the populationists greenwashes racism', *Green Left Weekly*, 17 August 2013.
- ³⁸ Twenty-eight per cent of graduates said in answer to question 22 'Yes, people can get the wrong idea about you if you do' raise questions about immigration, as compared with 26 per cent of non-graduates. See Table A.4 in Appendix 1.
- ³⁹ Mark Lopez, *The Little Black School Book, Vol 2*, Connor Court, 2009, pp. 34-35
- ⁴⁰ Simon Benson, 'Voters back migration cut', *The Australian*, 23 April 2018, p. 1
- ⁴¹ *The Essential Report*, 24 April 2018
- ⁴² Murray, 2018, op. cit.
- ⁴³ Quoted indirectly in Andrew Clennell, 'Premier pulled back on migrant debate', *The Australian*, 13 March 2018, p. 6
- ⁴⁴ Raymond Ritchie commenting on Andrew Markus, 'How do we feel about a "big Australia"? That depends on the poll', *The Conversation*, 14 March 2013
<<https://theconversation.com/how-do-we-feel-about-a-big-australia-that-depends-on-the-poll-93348>>
- ⁴⁵ *Household Use of Information Technology, Australia, 2014-15*, ABS, Catalogue no. 8146.0
- ⁴⁶ Scott Keeter, Nick Hatley, Courtney Kennedy and Arnold Lau, 'What low response rates mean for telephone surveys' Pew Research Center, 15 May 2017
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