



Politics and the population question during the pandemic

Drawing on the July 2021 TAPRI survey

Katharine Betts and Bob Birrell

Executive Summary.....	i
<i>Political implications</i>	<i>ii</i>
Preamble	1
<i>The setting in late July 2021</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Why polling on population is important now</i>	<i>1</i>
Survey results	3
<i>Immigration levels</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Discussion</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Immigration or training</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Revival of overseas student recruitment</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Border control</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Covid's effects on personal circumstances</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Does Australia need more people?</i>	<i>8</i>

<i>Foreign policy and self-reliance</i>	9
Social issues.....	10
<i>Gender and Indigenous issues</i>	12
Political and Policy implications	14
<i>How deep is voter concern about immigration/population?</i>	14
<i>Policy implications of concerns about high immigration</i>	15
<i>Australia is different</i>	16
The Coalition’s recent electoral domination	17
<i>The Coalition’s situation as of July 2021</i>	17
Social issues driving the crossover	20
Generational change and the prospects for progressive policies	26
The 2022 election outlook	29
<i>Immigration</i>	29
<i>Labor’s new immigration policy.</i>	31
<i>Humanitarian program levels</i>	31
<i>Social Issues</i>	32
Conclusion	34
Appendix A	37
Appendix B.....	43
<i>Methods</i>	43
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	43
Appendix C: 2021 TAPRI Questionnaire.....	44
References	50

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Executive Summary

The pandemic has disrupted any normal polling on population questions. Insofar as attitudes to immigration are concerned, the usual question asked, whether voters wanted more or less immigration, makes little sense. This is because net overseas migration (NOM) was negligible in the year to March 2021.

Nevertheless, the pandemic has created a unique opportunity to ask the Australian voting public what they think the level of immigration should be after it is all over. This question is the focus of the fourth TAPRI national survey of voters' attitudes to population growth, conducted during late July 2021.

The context was intriguing. Over the period March 2020 to July 2021 there had been no net migration to speak of. So those interest groups who wanted to see immigration come back to its pre-pandemic levels of around NOM of 240,000 a year, have had ample opportunity to present their case. (NOM has been running at around 240,000 a year for most of the last decade, accounting for the greater part of Australia's population growth. Numbers as high as 240,000 per year or more represent the Big Australia scenario.)

Major business groups, the property industry and the overseas student industry (among others) did indeed present their case. They were strongly supported in this by the Coalition Government, which made it clear that it would indeed return to former levels of NOM once the pandemic was under control.

This situation sets up a natural experiment. Do voters want the Big Australia policy back after they have had experience of over a year without it? Have advocates persuaded them that a return to high rates of population growth is desirable?

Voters were asked whether they wanted to see immigration levels restored to around 240,000 a year or higher, or whether they would prefer lower levels, including a balance of inward and outward movements (nil net migration). Their responses allow us to see whether the Big Australia advocates have been successful in putting their case.

The results show that they have not. Only 19 per cent of voters support a return to NOM of around 240,000 (Figure 1). The rest want much less, including 28 per cent who prefer nil net migration.

There has been a distinct hardening of attitudes towards immigration. Before the pandemic there was a rough balance between the share of voters wanting the current numbers to remain the same or to increase and those wanting them to decrease. But as of July 2021, only a small minority want Big Australia levels restored. The majority do not.

Interest groups arguing for the restoration of substantial immigration usually claim that this is necessary if employers are to employ the skilled workers they need and thus promote economic growth.

When we put this proposition to respondents only 26 per cent supported it (Figure 2). Most (61 per cent) chose an alternative proposition which was: 'We should deal with worker shortages by raising wages and improving skills training for locals'.

Similarly, most voters do not favour a return to the previous levels of overseas student recruitment (Figure 3).

Voters are not persuaded that Australia needs more people. Most, 69 per cent, say that it does not (Figure 8). When asked why they held this view (Table 1) big majorities indicate that

they think population growth is contributing to congestion, overcrowding of hospitals and schools, deterioration of the natural environment and the high cost of housing.

These findings show that majority opposition to a return to Big Australia levels of immigration is consistent with voters' awareness of its negative consequences.

Nevertheless, it is also likely that the hardening of voters' views has been influenced by their fears about the virus. There is strong support for keeping international borders closed to foreign travellers (Figure 4) and for state governments' prohibitions against movers across state borders (Figure 6). This suggests that fear of more infection and more disruption of normal life is playing a key role

Political implications

It is unlikely that these fears will abate much before the next federal election expected to be held early in 2022.

If this is the case, the Coalition will be disadvantaged, because it has copped much of the blame for the resurgence of the pandemic in NSW and Victoria since July 2021. Our analysis shows that it was in a strong electoral position in July, when the survey was conducted. Since then, probably as a result of this criticism, its electoral position has deteriorated. By early October it was well behind Labor in two-party preferred terms.

What might be the political implications of the findings outlined above? There is no serious possibility that the hardening of attitudes to immigration will have the profound political consequences that it has had in the UK, Western Europe and the US.

Nevertheless, the Coalition is potentially disadvantaged because, as of July, most of the voters intending to support the Coalition were opposed to the Government's Big Australia stance (see Table 11). This has not mattered in the past because Labor has been similarly supportive of Big Australia. Labor's bipartisanship has muted public debate and allowed high immigration to continue without any serious challenge.

But leading into the 2022 election Labor has taken a much more critical stance. It has expressed strong concern about the exploitation of temporary migrants in the labour market, and that this exploitation has occurred at the expense of the wages and conditions of local workers. Thus, if immigration were to become an election issue, it is the Coalition which would likely be the loser.

On other social issues, however, Labor is vulnerable because of its strong support for progressive positions. TAPRI asked voters their views about some of these issues, including gender fluidity and the prospect of supporting separate representation for Indigenous Australians as in a 'voice to parliament' (Figures 12, 13 and 14). Most voters do not support Labor's position on these questions. The party is at risk of losing voters on these causes, should the Coalition highlight them. The Coalition may very well do so should it still be lagging in the polls closer to the election.

The same is true for Labor's support for accepting more refugees and other displaced people. This includes their current support for a higher humanitarian intake and for permanent residence for asylum seekers who had arrived by boat some time ago. We did not ask about 'boat people' in this survey, but we did in 2019. The results showed that 58 per cent of voters agreed that 'all boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back' and only 21 per cent disagreed (Table 5).

Preamble

The Australian Population Research Institute (TAPRI) has been surveying Australian voters' attitudes towards population issues and their political implications since 2017. The second survey was in 2018 and the third was conducted in October/November 2019, well before March 2020 when the Covid pandemic began in Australia.

TAPRI's fourth and latest survey was in the field in late July 2021 (from the 23rd to the 31st), by which time Australian voters had endured over a year's experience with the pandemic. The survey was drawn from an online panel in a similar manner to those conducted by the major polling organisations, including Newspoll (now administered by YouGov). However, the TAPRI survey sample was larger than many others (a sample of 2,516), was restricted to voters only and weighted for level of education.

The setting in late July 2021

As far as population growth is concerned the setting in late July 2021 was quite unlike that of the pre-Covid years.

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Net Overseas Migration (NOM) in the year to December 2020, was minus 5,400. This compares with 247,600 in the year to December 2019, and similar annual figures over the previous decade.¹

Most survey respondents would not have known about the ABS data. But almost all would have been aware that, since March 2020, the pandemic had prompted the Federal Government to stop most movement of migrants into Australia. Even Australian citizens abroad have found re-entry extremely difficult.

For the leading Australian pollsters this new situation has meant that any current polling on immigration and population issues would not be comparable with pre-Covid surveys. With no net NOM in 2020, it would make little sense to ask respondents the standard question about whether they thought migration should increase or decrease.

While most pollsters do not usually ask about attitudes to immigration, those that do have dropped the question. For example it was not asked in the 2021 Lowy Institute poll.²

Why polling on population is important now

Substantial net migration has been a significant feature of Australia's demography since the end of WWII. Its absence since March 2020 offers a natural experiment which can potentially yield core insights into voters' attitudes to immigration-fuelled population growth.

The setting after the advent of Covid makes it possible to ask voters how they feel about this at an unprecedented time, a time when NOM has become negligible.

Rather than asking the questions about whether voters think migration should be increased or decreased TAPRI could ask something different. In the current Covid environment we could ask voters whether they wanted the previous immigration program to be restored and, if so, to what level.

The question TAPRI asked in 2019 (and in 2018 and 2017) was: 'Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased?' Responses were that it should be: increased a lot, increased a little, remain about the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot.³ In 2019 50 per cent had said either remain about the same, or increased a little or a lot.

In July 2021 we asked a different question: we asked:

When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views:

- 1 We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher.
- 2 We should return to net migration at somewhat lower levels.
- 3 We should return to net migration at much lower levels.
- 4 We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures.
- 5 Don't know

(The full wording is set out at Figure 1 below.)

By July 2021, voters had been exposed to over a year of persuasion by interests anxious to see that high immigration would be restored as soon as possible.

These interests include most business groups, such as the Housing Industry Association, the Committee for Economic Development in Australia, the Australian Industry Group, the Restaurant and Catering Association of Australia and the National Farmers' Association.⁴ Australia's universities have also called for a revival of overseas student enrolments, both in the interests of their revenue and for the some \$40 billion in export revenue that the overseas student industry is said to have been generating.⁵

Media outlets representing progressive interests, including the Nine newspapers and the ABC have almost all put a moral case for the revival of immigration. Here they are speaking of the virtues of open borders and Australia's humanitarian obligations, as well as cultural reasons, notably the enhancement of Australia's multicultural society.

The Australian government and its advisory agencies have endorsed this advocacy. Treasury's 2021 *Intergeneration Report* makes the economic case for a fast return to the previous numbers. This is a case that the Morrison Coalition government has embraced. In its 2021-22 budget, the Coalition set the target levels for NOM in 2023-24 and 2024-25 at 201,100 and 235,000 respectively.⁶ The Labor opposition has not challenged this commitment.

The TAPRI survey asks voters their opinions of the case made by advocates. If it were convincing we would expect most of them to agree that high immigration should be revived. Those agreeing would also be likely to include voters who think that their own interests are directly harmed by the precipitous drop in immigration. These would include people working in the tourist or international education industry as well as those providing services to migrants.

Immigration advocates would surely have expected a majority of voters to support their cause. This is especially because it concerned a revival of a policy practiced for over a decade rather than a move up or down from an existing high level.

This was not what we found.

Survey results

Immigration levels


The 2021 survey results show that there has been a distinct hardening of attitudes. In previous TAPRI and other surveys around 50 per cent of voters said they supported the maintenance of the existing level of 240,000 per year or a higher level.⁷

Voters were given some information before being asked their opinion on immigration. They were told that immigration had ‘increased sharply over the 10 years to December 2019. Over this decade Australia added 4 million extra people, more than the current population of Brisbane and Adelaide together (3.6 million). Over 64% of this growth was due to net overseas migration. Up until 2020 this has been around 240,000 migrants per year.’ (The 2019 immigration question had a similar preamble.)⁸

The 2021 respondents were then asked: ‘When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views?’ Figure 1 sets out the results.

Figure 1:

When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views?



Source: See Table A.1 in Appendix A

Discussion

Only 19 per cent of voters favoured a return to 240,000 a year or a higher number. Conversely, 42 per cent wanted a lower number, while 28 per cent favoured nil net migration. Another 11 per cent ‘said ‘don’t know’.

Clearly, only a small minority want to return to the pre-pandemic level. The arguments put by advocates for re-starting high immigration have not convinced most voters.

The TAPRI survey provided respondents with brief summaries of the key propositions of advocates, including the need for additional skilled workers in order to help the economy (see Figure 2). Big majorities indicated that they did not support these propositions. This was also true of attitudes to the international student industry (see Figure 3).

When TAPRI asked voters to give their view about immigration the question said ‘when borders reopen’. This implied that the Covid threat would have subsided by then. However, voters currently fearful of the pandemic might not be able to easily separate their present concerns from what might be the situation post-Covid. The Lowy institute poll was taken in

March 2021 during a period when the daily reported cases of infections was very low. Despite this, 59 per cent of respondents said that ‘Covid-19 and other potential epidemics’ were a critical threat ‘to the vital interests of Australia over the next ten years’.⁹

Voters’ opposition to allowing foreigners in at present, and to a lesser extent to allowing expatriates to return, reinforces the hypothesis that fear of the disease plays a strong role. (See Figures 5 and 6 below.)

We consider the political significance of fear in our subsequent analysis of the poll results. It may be that this is not a temporary phenomenon, should Covid continue to be active outside Australia. Nevertheless, our poll results (detailed below) show that large majorities of voters are concerned about various aspects of immigration levels, including urban congestion and housing prices.

Immigration or training

Advocates for a resumption of high immigration have stressed industry’s need for more skilled migrants. Here’s what respondents thought about this priority.

Figure 2: Immigrants or training:

Many employers now argue that we must open the borders as soon as possible, to allow temporary and permanent migrant workers in to help the economy. What do you think?

Source: See Table A.2 in Appendix A




Figure 2 shows that only a minority (26 per cent) are impressed by the argument put by many employers that importing more migrant workers is essential for economic growth.

On the contrary, 61 per cent believe any shortages should be dealt with by raising wages and improving local training.

Revival of overseas student recruitment


The overseas student industry has put a strong case for the revival of overseas student recruitment. The following question was designed to explore the public response.

The question displayed in Figure 3 began with the following preamble: ‘Before the pandemic Australia’s universities recruited large numbers of overseas students. In 2018 they made up 32 per cent of all new student enrolments. The universities want governments to allow these

numbers to be restored to their pre-Covid levels.’ Respondents were then asked: ‘Which of the following is closest to your views?’

Figure 3:

Which of the following is closest to your views?



Source: See Table A.3 in Appendix A.

Figure 3 shows that, just as the employers’ plea for more migrant workers fell largely on deaf ears, so too did that of the universities’ call for more international students.

Border control

Respondents were asked: ‘To what extent would you support or oppose the following measure to limit the spread of Covid-19? The closure of international borders to all foreign travellers?’

Figure 4 shows widespread support for closing international borders to foreigners in order to keep out Covid. Sixty-five per cent of voters support, or strongly support, this policy while only 17 per cent oppose it. The results are also set out by state. The differences by state (or territory) are not large, though voters in Tasmania and the Northern Territory are particularly likely to support the idea.

Overall the findings in Figure 4 reinforce the hypothesis suggested earlier that fear of infection is a strong driver of concern about any renewal of immigration.

Figure 4:
To what extent would you support or oppose the following measure to limit the spread of Covid-19?
The closure of international borders to all foreign travellers? By state or territory

Source: Table A.4 in Appendix A




Figure 5 repeats the format of Figure 4 but in this case the people to be excluded are Australian citizens or permanent residents. Where the members of our own community are concerned many voters (46 per cent) are prepared to face the risk of infection. A sense of obligation may be overriding fear of infection for many, but nonetheless 30 per cent of all voters would still exclude them.

Figure 5:
To what extent would you support or oppose the following measure to limit the spread of Covid-19?
The closure of international borders to all returning Australian citizens and permanent residents? By state or territory

Source: Table A.5 in Appendix A





Figure 6 shows that a strong majority of voters in Australia as a whole and in all states and territories support closing state borders. New South Wales at 58 per cent, however, is a partial exception. (The result for Victoria was 69 per cent.) In all other states and territories around 75 per cent supported the policy. The survey was being completed in late July. The second

wave of Covid infections in New South Wales began to accelerate in early July 2021 and was climbing steeply by the 23rd of July. By that date 137 people in the state were hospitalised with Covid.¹⁰

Figure 6:

During the pandemic State Governments have tried to exclude people who might carry the virus, either those arriving from overseas or from other states. What is your view on the states closing their borders? By state or territory



Source: Table A.6 in Appendix A.

Covid's effects on personal circumstances

What about the effect of personal hardship on attitudes to re-starting high immigration? We asked respondents about how the pandemic had affected their income and job opportunities. Nine per cent said it had made things better for them, 63 per cent that it had had very little or no effect, and 28 per cent that it had made things worse.

We wondered whether people's personal experience with the hardships and constraints of the pandemic, including loss of income and job opportunities since early 2020, had influenced their attitudes towards an immigration re-start.

Figure 7 shows attitudes to immigration by the share of those who felt that their income and job opportunities had been made better, stayed the same, or been made worse.

Figure 7:

When our borders reopen which of the following [re immigration] would be closest to your views?
By How has the pandemic affected your income and job opportunities?

Source: Table A.7 in Appendix A.




Figure 7 explores the extent to which these outcomes affected voters' attitudes to immigration levels.


The tiny minority who said that the pandemic had made things better are to the fore in preferring a return to high immigration: 33 per cent chose this option. In contrast, the 28 per cent who say that the pandemic has made things worse for them are much less enthusiastic, as are the majority who say that in economic terms it has had very little or no effect on them. People in tourism, hospitality and other migrant dependent industries would be among those whose economic circumstances had deteriorated. However, only 17 per cent of voters who said that the pandemic had made things worse want a return to high immigration and 33 per cent would prefer nil net migration.

Does Australia need more people?

Respondents were also asked the more general question of 'Does Australia need more people?' Figure 8 shows that a strong majority said 'No'.

Figure 8:

Overall do you think Australia needs more people?



Source: See Table A.8 in Appendix A

Sixty-nine per cent of voters think Australia does not need more people. This proportion is slightly lower than the responses this question elicited in the earlier TAPRI surveys (74 per cent in 2017 and 72 per cent in both 2018 and 2019).

This difference may be due to headlines claiming that Australia’s population is currently shrinking,¹¹ when in fact it is still growing from natural increase despite NOM that had slipped into minus territory.¹²


Foreign policy and self-reliance

Respondents were asked ‘After the Covid-19 pandemic, what do you think Australia’s foreign policy should be?’

Our purpose here was to explore whether most voters supported Australia’s bipartisan commitments to free trade. Figure 9 shows that they do not. Fifty-eight per cent think that after the pandemic is over Australia should focus on becoming more independent and self-reliant. Only 35 per cent support the existing commitment to free trade.

Possibly the unsettling experience of broken supply chains and increasing belligerence from China have contributed to this dissent.

Figure 9:
After the Covid-19 pandemic, what do you think Australia's foreign policy should be?




Source: Table A.9 in Appendix A

Social issues

TAPRI asked a number of questions touching on people's experience and perceptions of the social effects of population growth. One of them, explored in Figures 10 and 11 concerned housing affordability.

Figure 10:

Housing prices have risen since the pandemic began, making it harder for first home buyers to buy a home. How important does this issue seem to you?



Source: Table A.10 in Appendix A

Figure 10 shows that, in all, 87 per cent of voters thought that this was an important problem. Sixty-nine per cent thought that it was one of a number of important problems while 20 per cent thought it our most serious social problem.

Respondents were then asked to give their opinion on how important or otherwise four different policies might be for dealing with this problem.

Figure 11:

Which of the following policies do you think should be followed to improve first home buyers' access to housing?

For each policy chose one of the responses that follow.

(The graph labels set out the policies, and the key gives the response options.)

Source: Table A.11 Appendix A




Figure 11 shows that of the four options for improving first-home buyers' access to housing, fringe development in the outer suburbs is the most popular. A majority of respondents (over 60 per cent) also think keeping immigration low would be an important or very important policy to achieve this end.

Removing negative gearing is endorsed by 54 per cent of voters overall with only 24 per cent saying that this policy should not be followed.

Building more high-rise apartments is both the least popular policy and the most unpopular one by a large margin.

TAPRI asked voters about several other social issues, including policies concerning transgender rights and the establishment of an Indigenous ‘voice to parliament’. The results are shown in Figures 12, 13 and 14.

Figure 12:

A number of people who were born male now identify as female. Do you think they should be allowed to compete in women’s sports?

Source: Table A.12 in Appendix A.




Figure 12 shows that only 22 per cent of voters think that transwomen should be allowed to compete in women’s sports, while 60 per cent think that this should not be allowed.

Figure 13:

Some people argue that a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman, regardless of their sex when born. What do you think?

Source: Table A.13 in Appendix A





Figure 13 shows that more voters are happier with the idea of gender fluidity than they are with transwomen competing in women’s sports, but this group is still outnumbered by voters who do not accept the idea.

Figure 14 shows that 33 per cent agree that Indigenous Australians should have a separate 'voice to parliament' while 56 per cent disagree.

Figure 14:
The Australian government is considering giving separate representation to Indigenous Australians in a special, elected body called a 'voice to parliament' so that they can advance their interests. What is your opinion?

Source: Table A.14 in Appendix A



Overall there is limited enthusiasm among voters for policies that are currently high on the progressive agenda.

Political and Policy implications

We now explore the political and policy implications of these survey results. The starting point is an assessment of whether the hardening of attitudes towards high migration has any political implications.

It may not, given that there has long been a disjunction between the views of elites from the left and the right and ordinary people's views on Australia's high migration policy. Elites favour high immigration. Most ordinary people do not. Yet this division has not deterred successive governments (whether Labor or Coalition) from continuing with the policy.

There are two issues to consider. One is that this time it may be different given that, by 2021, a far higher share of voters opposes the policy than has been the case in the recent past. This may be partly because Covid and the risk of infection has thrown a spotlight on borders and migration. In this respect we need to explore whether this recently expanded majority is an outlier, shaped temporarily by fears about Covid.

A second issue is this. Even if voter concerns are long lasting, will they have any effect on immigration policy? We consider this issue later, in the context of the 2022 election.

How deep is voter concern about immigration/population?

Fears about Covid may well abate as the pandemic ebbs. However, as of late 2021, there are anxieties that Covid will be around for years in Australia, and especially in migration source countries. These apprehensions may well continue to stoke ongoing fear of immigration bringing in more waves of disease.

In any case, our survey results indicate that most voters have other concerns, besides Covid, about immigration and its demographic effects. These concerns are unlikely to be ephemeral.

Some 69 per cent of respondents answered 'No' to the question about whether Australia needs more people (see Figure 8 above). We asked this majority why they held this view. Here are the issues that most concerned them about 'too many people'.

'Our cities are overcrowded and there is too much traffic' (81 per cent strongly agree or agree).

'Our hospitals and schools are overcrowded' (79 per cent strongly agree or agree).

'The natural environment is under stress with the number of people we already have' (78 per cent strongly agree or agree).

'Adding more people will push up the cost of housing' (81 per cent strongly agree or agree).

See Table 1.

Table 1: Reasons given by voters who say Australia does not need more people %

<i>This is because:</i>	Our cities are overcrowded and there is too much traffic.	Our hospitals and schools are over-crowded.	The natural environment is under stress with the number of people we already have.	Adding more people will push up the cost of housing
Agree Strongly	37	38	38	41
Agree	43	41	40	40
Neither agree nor disagree	14	17	16	14
Disagree	4	4	5	4
Disagree Strongly	1	1	1	0
Total agree	81	79	78	81
Total disagree	5	5	6	5
Total 'Australia does not need more people' %	100	100	100	100
Total 'Australia does not need more people' N	1727	1727	1727	1727

We also asked respondents about the implications of immigration for housing affordability for first home buyers. They were asked whether they thought it was important or not to 'keep immigration low to reduce competition for existing housing'. Sixty-five per cent thought it was very important or important. (See Figure 11 above.)

Policy implications of concerns about high immigration

The reality is that though around a half of Australian voters have for years not supported Big Australia immigration this has had a negligible effect on policy. There has been a tacit agreement between leaders of the Coalition and the Labor Party to maintain a high intake and to do so with as little public debate as possible. This has insulated immigration policy from normal democratic processes.¹³

In this regard the contrast between Australia's situation and that of the UK, the US and much of Western Europe is sharp. In these countries immigration levels, even though often below those experienced in Australia, have had profound electoral and policy consequences. An understanding of why this is the case should help us comprehend why Australia is (or has been) different.

In the UK, recent studies confirm that immigration was the most important factor in the outcome of 2016 Brexit referendum, when 52 per cent of those voting supported leaving the European Union.¹⁴

The main source of the immigration that prompted this response was Eastern Europe. It followed the European Union's (EU) expansion into Eastern Europe in the early 2000s. The movement stemmed from the decision of the Labour government in 2004 to allow unlimited entry to the UK (with full work rights) of residents from these new EU member countries. Between May 2004 and Sept 2005 some 293,000 migrants from these countries (mostly Poles) entered Britain.¹⁵ Membership of the EU implied a continuing inflow of migrants from these newly admitted countries.

Concern about the consequences of this influx made a major contribution to negative attitudes about Britain's membership of the EU.

These concerns also contributed to the success of Boris Johnson's Conservative victory in the late 2019 national election, and conversely, to the Labour Party's poor performance. Johnson had been a prominent Brexiteer while Labour had adopted a more equivocal approach.

Uncontrolled immigration from Eastern Europe attracted many former working-class Labour voters, first to an anti-immigration and anti-EU party, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and then, later, to the Conservative Party. By the time of the October 2019 election the Conservatives were led by Johnson. Johnson had defeated the incumbent liberal, open-borders, pro-EU faction of the party. He successfully led the Conservatives to victory on a pro-Brexit and anti-immigration agenda, in the process winning a huge swag of formerly Labour-held predominantly working-class seats.

UKIP attracted much of its voter support from former blue-collar Labour supporters. These voters were attracted to UKIP because they disliked the progressive, open borders commitments of both the Labour and Conservative leaders at the time. After the Brexit vote this changed, at least for the Conservative leaders, when David Cameron decided he should resign.¹⁶

Scholars have shown that this split in the UK is mirrored in sharp divisions between graduate and non-graduate voters. Most graduates embrace progressive views about social justice, social diversity, open borders and cosmopolitanism. Most opposed Brexit in 2016 because not only was Britain's continuing membership of the EU a valued source of career opportunities, it was also consistent with their progressive beliefs.

On the other hand, most non-graduates are more parochial. They are attached to an inclusive national identity and unapologetic about their sense of patriotism. In David Goodhart's words they tend to be 'somewhere' people while graduates are more likely to be 'anywhere' people.¹⁷ The Brexit leaders were able to draw on the support of a majority of these non-graduates.

A similar transformation occurred in the US when the Republican party, hitherto a strong supporter of immigration and free trade, was taken over by Donald Trump. (This was when he won the party's presidential nomination in 2016.) Trump's victory in the subsequent election destroyed the previous bipartisan endorsement of relatively open borders among American political elites.

Trump also championed a revival of industrial independence. His *Make America Great Again* slogan pitched for a more self-reliant America. This was to be an America in which much of the industrial capacity lost to Asia, particularly China, over the preceding decades, would somehow be brought back home. Trump succeeded in the election because he attracted a critical mass of, mainly, non-graduate voters. They endorsed his program, for much the same reasons as non-graduates had backed Brexit in the UK.¹⁸

Australia is different

There has been no parallel to the UK's third-party mobilisation of disgruntled non-graduate voters in Australia, the mobilisation of which led to the transformation of the UK Conservative Party. Nor have we seen the fissuring of the dominant right-leaning party (the Coalition) such as occurred with the Conservatives in the UK and the Republicans in the US.

Nonetheless, as detailed in the report of the 2019 TAPRI results, it was a close-run thing. In 2018, a faction led by Peter Dutton got enough votes to force the then leader of the Liberal

Party, Malcolm Turnbull, to stand down. Dutton had mobilised Liberals who opposed Turnbull's internationalist and progressive commitments and who favoured more nationalistic and restrictive immigration policies. However, in the subsequent contest for the Liberal leadership, Dutton was defeated by Scott Morrison. Morrison was able to combine the support of the internationalist (and high immigration wing of the party) with his own small, Christian faction, to defeat Dutton. He won by just 45 votes to 40.¹⁹

As a result of the Morrison's victory, immigration levels were a non-issue in the March 2019 federal election. Morrison favoured a Big Australia agenda. So did the Labor Party and so did the Greens. There was no substantial, reputable, third party capable of putting an alternative view to the voters.

The Coalition's recent electoral domination

The Coalition has won successive federal elections because it has won a majority of both the graduate and non-graduate voting constituency. The Coalition has held power at the Federal level from 1996 to today with the exception of the Rudd/Gillard era between 2007 and 2013.

The non-graduate constituency is crucial because there are far more non-graduate voters than there are graduate voters. As in 2019 the 2021 TAPRI survey was weighted to reflect the numbers of graduates and non-graduates among the voting population.²⁰ There were 1745 or 69 per cent of the latter in the sample as against 771 or 31 per cent of the former. The implications are clear. The Coalition has bled Labor's original electoral strength amongst routine white-collar voters and blue-collar voters.

The TAPRI survey shows that as of July 2021 the Coalition was in a good position to win the next election. That has changed since July, since which time the Coalition leaked electoral support. By October it was well behind Labor on the two-party preferred vote. We explore the factors behind this swing below. For the present the focus is on the Coalition's position as of July when the TAPRI survey was in the field. It is important to understand the Coalition's strengths at this time. On this basis we are in a better position to estimate in what circumstances the Coalition might recover by the time of the 2022 election and what role (if any) immigration and social issues could play in such a recovery.

The Coalition's situation as of July 2021

Table 2 shows that, as of July 2021, a majority of non-graduate voters intended to vote Coalition, One Nation or 'other', predominantly conservative parties.²¹

Likewise, a majority (though smaller) of graduates intended to support the Coalition.

Table 2: ‘If a federal election for the House of Representatives were held today, which one of the following would you vote for? If “uncommitted” to which one of these do you have a leaning?’ By education, as of 23-31 July 2021 %

	Non-graduate	Graduate	Total
Coalition	39	42	40
Labor	32	33	32
Greens	9	13	10
One Nation (ON)	8	4	7
Other	12	9	11
Coalition plus ON plus Other	59	55	58
Labor plus Greens	41	45	42
Total %	100	100	100
Total N	1745	771	2516

As indicated, the non-graduate voting constituency is the key to explaining the Coalition’s past electoral strength. This is not just because it is larger than the graduate constituency but because, as Table 3 shows, there has been a longstanding movement of non-graduate voters into the Coalition camp.

Table 3: Votes for parties of the right and the left by educational status, 1984 to 2019, and 2021

Year	% <i>Graduates in each sample</i>	% Non- graduates voting Coalition or ‘other’	% Graduates voting Coalition or ‘other’	% Non- graduates voting Labor or Greens <i>(Greens from 1996 on)</i>	% Graduates voting Labor or Greens <i>(Greens from 1996 on)</i>
1984	7.3	41	36	60	64
1987	9.6	48	53	51	47
1990	10.2	58	68	42	33
1993	14.3	51	54	50	46
1996	19.1	63	58	38	42
1998	17.1	56	62	44	38
2001	19.2	59	49	41	51
2004	22.3	57	47	43	53
2007	24.4	49	37	50	62
2010	27.3	50	41	50	59
2013	30.8	61	50	39	50
2016	36.1	58	51	42	49
2019	25.0	55	47	45	53
<i>2021 Tapri</i>	<i>30.6</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>45</i>

Notes: The data for 1984 to 2019 are from the Australian Election Studies (AES). These were published in Katharine Betts and Bob Birrell, ‘A big Australia: why it may all be over,’ TAPRI, 2020, p. 21 and pp. 39-41. One Nation is grouped with ‘other’ in Table 3. While the AES is limited to voters only, as is TAPRI, the format, sampling and

questions asked by TAPRI in 2021 are not identical to those used by the AES. However our question on voting intention is borrowed from the AES.

As Table 3 indicates, there has also been a tendency for a movement of graduate voters away from the Coalition to Labor and the Greens. If the data for graduates in 1990 are compared with those of 2019 this trend away from the Coalition (or ‘other’) is strong, but the 2021 TAPRI data suggest that this movement has stabilised. By contrast the movement of non-graduates away from Labor (or Greens) is relatively steady from 1984 to 2021. Moreover, the movement of graduates to Labor/Greens has been way short of what would be needed to compensate for the movement of the more numerous non-graduates away from Labor/Greens to Coalition/other.

While it is still the case that graduates are more likely to vote Labor or Greens than are non-graduates, as of mid-2021 the Coalition and other right-leaning parties commanded a majority of graduate votes (55 per cent).

Table 4 shows that this tendency is marked among graduates in Management, Commerce and Law as well as those in Science, IT, Engineering, Architecture and related studies. In contrast, graduates whose highest university qualification was in Society and Culture, the Health professions and Education are more inclined to vote Labor or Greens.

Table 4: ‘If a federal election for the House of Representatives were held today, which one of the following would you vote for? If “uncommitted” to which one of these do you have a leaning? By ‘Which of the groupings below include the field of study of your highest university qualification?’ , graduates only %

	Management, Commerce & Law	Science, IT, Engineering, Architecture, & related studies	Other field of study	Society, Culture & Creative Arts	Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy & related health studies	Education	Total graduates
Coalition	53	49	36	30	29	37	42
Other	16	10	14	18	15	7	13
Labor	27	28	35	37	38	37	33
Greens	5	13	15	15	17	20	13
Coalition or Other	68	59	50	48	45	43	55
Labor or Greens	32	41	50	52	55	57	45
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	202	167	63	85	137	118	771

Note: ‘Other’ includes One Nation.

Social issues driving the crossover

The most striking aspect of Table 3 is the drift of non-graduate voters from left-leaning parties to those of the right. The main reason for this crossover is that, as in elections in the UK, Europe and the US, so in Australia, voting preferences are now decided more on social than on economic issues.

This gives the Coalition an advantage. It has been able to sustain a high growth economic policy partly built around its 'jobs and growth' mantra. This policy has depended heavily on its Big Australia immigration policy, which has delivered strong labour-force growth and consumer demand.

This means that with strong employment and GDP growth the Coalition has not had to worry much about any class-based appeal that Labor might make to disadvantaged voters. Nor has the Coalition had to concern itself with voters' dissatisfaction with many of the consequences of high migration. This is because Labor has not challenged it on these consequences.

In these circumstances the points of dissension that matter are social policies. The Coalition, like right-leaning parties in the UK, has had an advantage on this terrain.

In every case elites shaping policy for parties on the left on social questions are progressives. This reflects the growing domination of graduates within their ranks. But this progressive stance has alienated many non-graduates, most of whom are relatively conservative on social issues.

In Australia, the Labor Party is the main loser. It has become locked into competing with the Greens for the progressive vote. This strategy has meant that Labor has been able to harvest most of the Greens' preferences. But it has been at the cost of losses from its previous blue-collar and other non-graduate voters.

The first decisive evidence of this phenomenon occurred in 1996 when the Howard-led Coalition won the Federal election in a landslide. As Table 3 shows it won a strong majority of non-graduates. Indeed, more working-class people (manual workers and people in routine clerical jobs) voted for the Coalition than for Labor.²² The Coalition's drawcard was its opposition to Keating's social agenda – his support for various ethnic and Indigenous groups, together with multiculturalism and an embrace of Asia.

Since that time new issues have emerged which have helped the Coalition retain its non-graduate constituency. The most potent has been its policies on asylum seekers.

Table 5, drawn from the 2019 TAPRI survey, is on voters' attitudes to the turnback of boats carrying asylum seekers. It illustrates the point. While 58 per cent of voters agreed with the policy, non-graduates were 10 percentage points more likely to strongly agree with it than were graduates, and nine percentage points less likely to disagree or disagree

Table 5: ‘All boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back’, by education (TAPRI 2019) %

	Total Non-graduates	Total Graduates	Total sample
Agree strongly	36	26	34
Agree	24	25	24
Neither agree nor disagree	21	21	21
Disagree	13	18	14
Disagree strongly	6	10	7
Total agree	60	51	58
Total disagree	19	28	21
Total %	100	100	100
Total N	1684	530	2214

Tables 6A and 6B show that agreement with turning back the boats was strongly associated with support for right-leaning parties, while disagreement was strongly associated with support for left-leaning parties. This is true for both non-graduates and graduates. However, there were far more non-graduates agreeing with the policy than graduates.

For progressives, to endorse turning back asylum seekers is to violate their core moral concern of compassion for refugees. Yet Table 5 shows that not all graduates share this progressive concern. Fifty-one per cent of them do not. Nonetheless those who hold the value are vigorous in endorsing it, while the non-conformists tend not to participate in open debate.

Table 6A: Intended vote by ‘All boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back,’ non-graduates only (TAPRI 2019 data) %

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Total non-graduates	<i>Total sample</i>
Coalition	46	40	30	22	11	36	40
Other	32	22	21	7	12	23	17
Labor	20	34	38	51	39	32	32
Greens	2	5	11	20	38	9	10
Coalition or Other	78	62	51	29	23	59	58
Labor or Greens	22	38	49	71	77	41	42
Total non-grad %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total non-grad N	614	401	354	221	94	1684	2516

Note: ‘Other’ includes One Nation.

Table 6B: Intended vote by ‘All boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back,’ graduates only (TAPRI 2019 data)

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Total graduates	Total sample
Coalition	68	60	38	22	10	46	40
Other	15	10	9	9	9	11	17
Labor	12	24	38	47	44	30	32
Greens	6	6	16	22	37	14	10
Coalition or Other	82	70	47	31	18	56	58
Labor or Greens	18	30	53	69	82	44	42
Total graduates %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total graduates N	137	133	112	96	53	530	2516

Note: ‘Other’ includes One Nation.

Whether or not asylum seekers again become a burning political question, progressive elites have put other new social issues on to the agenda, issues which challenge mainstream views. Some have the potential to shape election outcomes should they be debated at the time of the next election.

These include attitudes to ethnic rights (borrowed from the Black Lives Matter movement), together with the rights of gender minorities and a host of other identity groups.

As detailed above, TAPRI asked questions about two of these topics.

One concerned gender fluidity. Advocates of gender choice have been active in progressive circles.²³ They have won some support from State Labor governments, as in changes to legal rights to change one’s gender, and at the national level in policies shaping educational curriculums and the language used to describe gender.

Our survey (Figure 12) found that only 22 per cent of voters support the idea that trans women (people who were born male but now identify as female) should be allowed to compete in women’s sport. There was little difference here between graduates and non-graduates.²⁴

However, Table 7 shows that only a minority of either graduate or non-graduate voters support the more general idea of gender fluidity. But here there is a stronger difference between non-graduates and graduates. Overall 30 per cent of voters accept the idea of gender fluidity, but there is a gap of 10 percentage points here between the 27 per cent of non-graduates who accept the idea and the 37 per cent of graduates who accept it.

Table 7: ‘Some people argue that a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman, regardless of their sex when born. What do you think?’ by education

	Total non-graduates	Total graduates	Total sample
Strongly agree	11	14	12
Agree	16	23	18
Neither agree nor disagree	26	24	25
Disagree	22	19	21
Strongly disagree	25	21	23
Total agree	27	37	30
Total disagree	47	40	45
Total %	100	100	100
Total N	1745	771	2516

Tables 8A and 8B show that, for both non-graduate and graduate voters, the concept of gender fluidity is polarising. In both cases those who strongly agree with the concept intend to vote Labor or Greens (60 per cent of them in the case of non-graduates and a full 75 per cent in the case of graduates).

At the other end of the spectrum among the non-graduates who strongly disagree 71 per cent intend to vote Coalition or Other, as do 77 per cent of graduates. And, as with the boat people question, unhappy non-graduates outnumber approving graduates. Nevertheless at the time of our survey there were still some 37 per cent of non-graduates who intended to vote Labor who disagreed and 23 per cent who strongly disagreed with the gender fluidity proposition (Table 8A). Many of these voters might be drawn to the Coalition if this transgender problematic became an election issue.

Table 8A: Vote by ‘Some people argue that a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman, regardless of their sex when born. What do you think?’ non-graduates only %

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total non-graduates	Total sample
Coalition	29	48	39	39	40	39	40
Other	11	6	20	20	31	19	17
Labor	31	36	34	37	23	32	32
Greens	29	10	7	5	6	9	10
Coalition or Other	40	54	59	58	71	59	58
Labor or Greens	60	46	41	42	29	41	42
Total non-grad %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total non-grad N	194	280	447	392	431	1745	2516

Note: ‘Other’ includes One Nation.

Table 8B: Vote by ‘Some people argue that a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman, regardless of their sex when born. What do you think?’ graduates only %

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total graduates	Total sample
Coalition	21	41	39	47	54	42	40
Other	4	5	15	15	23	13	17
Labor	43	35	36	33	17	33	32
Greens	32	18	10	4	6	13	10
Coalition or Other	25	47	54	62	77	55	58
Labor or Greens	75	53	46	38	23	45	42
Total graduates %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total graduates N	108	174	185	145	159	771	2516

Note: ‘Other’ includes One Nation.

Advocacy for Indigenous Australians to have a ‘voice’ in the national parliament is another significant emerging issue. It has attracted strong progressive support within the Labor and Greens parties. Support for Indigenous causes has become a central marker of identity for many of these progressives.

TAPRI asked respondents this question: ‘The Australian government is considering giving separate representation to Indigenous Australians in a special, elected body called a ‘voice to parliament’ so that they can advance their interests. What is your opinion?’ The results are shown in Figure 14 (above).

The results by graduates and non-graduates are set out in the following two tables.

Table 9: ‘The Australian government is considering giving separate representation to Indigenous Australians in a special, elected body called a “voice to parliament” so that they can advance their interests. What is your opinion?’ By education %

	Non-graduates	Graduates	Total
They should have a separate ‘voice to parliament’.	28	43	33
They should not have a separate ‘voice to parliament’ because all Australians should be treated as equals. A separate voice could encourage racial and ethnic divisions	60	47	56
Don’t know	12	10	11
Total %	100	100	100
Total N	1745	771	2516

Table 9 shows that a majority of voters (56 per cent) do not support the ‘voice to parliament’, another 33 per cent do support the cause, while the rest (11 per cent) ‘don’t know’.

However, there is much more support among graduate voters for the ‘voice’ than amongst non-graduate voters.

Tables 10A and 10B set out the political party preferences of voters on this question. Graduate voters who are supporters are largely Labor or Green voters. Indeed, a majority of the graduates who support the ‘voice’ are Labor or Green voters. This helps explain why both

Labor and Greens elites also support it. If Labor took a different stance it would risk losing progressive voters to the Greens.

Even so, less than half of graduates (43 per cent) support the ‘voice’ as do only 28 per cent of non-graduate voters.

Table 10A: Intended vote by ‘The Australian government is considering giving separate representation to Indigenous Australians in a special, elected body called a “voice to parliament” so that they can advance their interests’, non-graduates only %

	They should have a separate ‘voice’ to parliament.	They should not have a separate ‘voice to parliament’ because...	Don’t know	Total non-graduates	<i>Total sample</i>
Coalition	36	45	22	39	40
Other	11	21	33	19	17
Labor	35	30	37	32	32
Greens	18	5	8	9	10
Coalition or Other	47	65	55	59	58
Labor or Greens	53	35	45	41	42
Total %	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	491	1050	204	1745	2516

Note: ‘Other’ includes One Nation.

Table 10B: Intended vote by ‘The Australian government is considering giving separate representation to Indigenous Australians in a special, elected body called a “voice to parliament” so that they can advance their interests’, graduates only %

	They should have a separate ‘voice’ to parliament.	They should not have a separate ‘voice to parliament’ because...	Don’t know	Total graduates	<i>Total sample</i>
Coalition	32	50	42	42	40
Other	7	17	20	13	17
Labor	40	28	21	33	32
Greens	20	5	17	13	10
Coalition or Other	40	67	62	55	58
Labor or Greens	60	33	38	45	42
Total %	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	331	363	77	771	2516

Note: ‘Other’ includes One Nation.

Tables 10A and 10B show that two thirds of both graduates and non-graduates who think there should not be a separate ‘voice to parliament’ intend to vote Coalition or ‘Other’ while a majority of those who think there should be a ‘voice’ intend to vote Labor or Greens.

However, this still leaves some 30 per cent of non-graduate Labor voters and 28 per cent of graduate Labor voters who do not think there should be a ‘voice’ in parliament. If ‘voice’

becomes an election issue, the Coalition could be well placed to attract some of these Labor voters.

Generational change and the prospects for progressive policies

Currently, a progressive stance on social issues is an electoral disadvantage. Some argue that it may not be a long-lasting disadvantage. For example, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argue in their monumental analysis that the future is on the side of progressives. This is because of the dominance of progressive views amongst young people and especially young graduates. Norris and Inglehart trace the movement of cohorts over time through the age structure. Their data suggest that, as these cohorts age, they retain the attitudes they held when young. For this reason, and because an increasing proportion of young people are graduates, they conclude that progressive causes will eventually prevail at the electoral level.²⁵

But this is a long-term outlook, without much relevance to the next Federal election.

Nevertheless, before looking more closely at the 2022 election prospects, we provide some analysis drawn from the TAPRI survey on the generational hypothesis. If it applied in the Australian context we would expect that, as graduates age, they would tend to retain progressive views on social issues.

Attitudes to immigration by age group for non-graduates and for graduates (Figures 15 and 16) are a good test of this thesis.

Figure 15: Re immigration: 'when our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views' by age, non-graduates
The full wording of the immigration question is at Figure 1 above

Source: Appendix A, Table A.15





Figure 16: Re immigration: 'when our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views' by age, graduates

The full wording of the immigration question is at Figure 1 above

Source: Appendix A, Table A.16



The data provide only luke-warm support for the Norris and Inglehart's hypothesis. Figures 15 and 16 follow the two poles of the scale on the immigration question that TAPRI asked: 'We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher' or 'We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures', the nil net migration option.

The Figures show that younger people, whether non-graduates or graduates, are more likely to favour a large intake but that, for non-graduates especially, this enthusiasm fades quite quickly among the older age groups. By the time they are in their forties the non-graduates favouring nil net migration far outnumber those favouring a high intake. Among the graduates this pattern is present, but in a muted form.

Nonetheless, the proportion of graduates aged 35 and over who favour nil net migration is substantial and in some cases outnumbers the proportion wanting a large intake. The survey is of course a snapshot of a moment in time, not a time series. But most of the graduates now in their mid-forties, for example, would have been at university in the late 1990s when progressive values were strong on Australia campuses. In 1996, 60 per cent of graduate voters aged 18 to 34 wanted immigration to be either increased or remain about the same (compared to 30 per cent of same aged non-graduate voters).²⁶ Though a majority of youthful graduates in the mid 1990s favoured high immigration, the effects seem to have worn off for many of them by the time they reached their mid- to late forties.

Another test of Norris and Inglehart thesis is provided by responses to the question on an Indigenous 'voice to parliament'. Responses are analysed by age and education in Figures 17 and 18.

Figure 17:

Should there be an indigenous 'voice to parliament' by age group, non-graduates

(The full wording of the question is with Table 9 above,)

Source: Appendix A, Table A.17





Figure 18:

Should there be an indigenous 'voice to parliament' by age group, graduates

(The full wording of the question is with Table 9 above,)

Source: Appendix A, Table A.18



Figures 17 and 18 show that the differences apparent in Table 9 do vary with age but, as with Figure 16, older graduates now in their middle to late forties are more sceptical about this proposal than are graduates aged in their twenties and thirties. This is despite much enthusiasm for Indigenous causes on campuses when these middle-aged graduates were studying.

This evidence suggests that the Norris and Inglehart thesis is only partly valid for Australia. For some graduates progressive values absorbed in their youth endure; for others age, experience and changes of milieu bring modifications.

The 2022 election outlook

At the time of our survey, in late July 2021, the Coalition government seemed to be in a good position to contest the 2022 election, given its strength, especially amongst non-graduates. However, as noted above, by October 2021 this was no longer the case. Labor held a strong advantage on two-party preferred measures of around 53 to 47 per cent. This is according to an average of surveys conducted by Newspoll between July 14 and September 18, 2021.²⁷

For Newspoll, the decline in Coalition support started a month or so earlier than TAPRI's survey in July and of some other polls. But the Resolve Strategic Poll conducted for the Nine Newspapers and published in August 2021, had the Coalition on 40 per cent with Labor on 32 per cent, the same result as TAPRI found in late July.²⁸ However, most major polls concur on the decline in Coalition electoral support since July 2021, especially on the two-party preferred vote. Nevertheless, on 27 June 2021, Newspoll's findings on the primary vote are quite close to those of TAPRI's.²⁹

The change in voting preferences around July/August 2021 seems to reflect the upsurge in Covid cases in NSW during July³⁰ and the reinstatement of a lockdown in Victoria as of July 15.³¹

This reversal for the Coalition may not be surprising given our earlier findings about the extent of fear amongst voters about the pandemic. Their concerns have provided a backbone of support for lockdowns in the states. The Commonwealth seems to have borne the brunt of the blame for the discouraging renewal of the pandemic in July 2021. This is probably because the Commonwealth has been hectoring the states to open their borders. It is also vulnerable to criticism that the upsurge of cases is its fault because of delays in the availability of vaccines (which is a federal responsibility). Labor politicians have done their best to cement this perception. In doing this they have been active in blaming the Coalition government for the renewal of the pandemic.

Polling seems to support this conclusion. In the late September 2021 Essential Poll, the federal government's handling of Covid was marked down from 55-60 per cent 'good' in June to just 40-45 per cent 'good' in August/September.³²

Since the pandemic shows no signs of abating, the Coalition may have to withstand this criticism, right up to the election.

How might the Coalition and Labor respond in this electoral situation, when the Coalition faces defeat and Labor can see a potential victory? Our interest is in what role debate about immigration and social issues might play. The context is that Labor has moved to neutralise what it perceives to be the Coalition's advantages on tax and related issues that are thought to appeal to 'suburban' aspirational voters. This implies that other issues including immigration and social issues may become more influential, especially immigration, given the hardening of voters' concerns that we have identified.

Immigration

During the pandemic, as the various interests benefiting from high migration put their case for a renewal of Big Australia the Coalition leaders probably thought that they had little to lose from running with this agenda prior to the election.

We now know that it will run into much stiffer voter resistance than has been the case in the past. The 'great experiment' of ceasing immigration has given voters a chance to see that this has had advantages for them. For example, a tighter labour market works in their favour. TAPRI's research shows that voters' responses to a revival of immigration is a resounding negative. Only a small minority (19 per cent) support the revival that the Government has

proposed. Also, at the level of elite commentary there is much less consensus about the gains from high migration than there has been in the recent past. In particular, there has been support for the proposition that the influx of migrant workers has been a key determinant of the low level of real wage gains across the workforce in recent years.³³

Does this dissent matter?

Immigration will only become an issue if the Labor Party makes it so – a possibility we consider shortly.

But if it did there would be tensions within the Coalition itself. As Table 11 shows, at the time of the TAPRI survey in July, only 18 per cent of intending Coalition voters supported the Big Australia policy. The great majority opposed it. As we have emphasised, this majority is largely drawn from the non-graduate constituency that the Coalition has attracted. In a close election, Coalition politicians holding marginal electorates would have to worry about their survival. Some of those who are members of the more nationalistic Dutton faction, including Dutton himself, might press for a change in immigration policy.

Table 11: ‘When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views’ by intended vote %

	Coalition	Labor	Greens	One Nation	Other	Total
1... around 240,000 a year or higher	18	23	33	5	9	19
2... net migration at somewhat lower levels	28	22	22	6	12	22
3... net migration at much lower levels	22	19	10	33	14	20
4 [Nil net migration]	26	26	15	52	36	28
5 Don't know	7	10	20	5	29	11
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	1008	810	259	170	270	2516

Response categories:

- 1 We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher.
- 2 We should return to net migration at somewhat lower levels.
- 3 We should return to net migration at much lower levels.
- 4 We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures.
- 5 Don't know

As to Labor's stance, the experience of recent elections suggests that Labor would not make immigration an issue. The party has long provided bipartisan support for Big Australia policies. One of the reasons is that the left of the party values high migration because of its links with progressive policies on ethnic diversity, multiculturalism and an open borders approach to asylum seekers. Also, as noted, Labor has been in competition with the Greens for voters in inner-city progressive electorates. The concern has been that if Labor were to develop a tough immigration policy, the Greens party's strong endorsement a more open-borders approach³⁴ might attract some progressive Labor voters into the Greens camp.

At the time of the 2019 election, Labor announced migration policies that would have resulted in an even bigger outcome for the program than that advocated by the Coalition. This mainly derived from the party's humanitarian and family reunion commitments.

As to the latter, just prior to the 2019 election Labor announced a new parent visa proposal which promised all migrant families that they could sponsor their parents on long-term visas. If the policy had been implemented it would have generated at least 200,000 parent applications over a three-year period. This was way above the annual outcome (around 15,000) likely to have occurred with the Coalition's parent visa proposal.³⁵

Labor's new immigration policy.

Labor's stance on immigration prior to the 2022 election is quite different. Its platform, drafted at the party's Special Platform Conference in March 2021 does not endorse a Big Australia target. On the contrary, it puts much more emphasis on safeguarding the interests of Australian workers from migrant competition, especially that coming from migrants holding temporary work visas. This stems from concern about the extent to which employers have been exploiting temporary migrants. Such exploitation has been rife in low skilled industries, including hospitality and horticulture.³⁶ Also, there is no reference in the Program to the Party's previous expansive family reunion policies. The 2019 parent visa proposal is nowhere to be seen.

Consistent with this more critical stance Labor has floated some tougher migration policies.

One initiative was driven by Federal Labor's spokesperson on immigration and home affairs, Kristina Keneally. In a May 2020 *Sydney Morning Herald* opinion piece, she argued for an 'Australia First' hiring policy. Keneally put the question: In the post-Covid-19 situation, 'do we want migrants to return to Australia in the same numbers and in the same composition as before the crisis?' Her answer was: 'No. Our economic recovery must help all Australians get back on their feet, and to do that we need a migration program that puts Australian workers first'.³⁷

An independent assessment of the electoral response was conducted by the Essential poll and published on 12 May 2020. This told respondents about Keneally's statement and then asked: 'To what extent, do you support or oppose this idea of "Australia first" hiring?' Sixty-seven per cent supported it, including 75 per cent of Coalition voters and 63 per cent of Labor voters.³⁸

In a tight 2022 election, where there are few policy differences between the major parties, Labor might be tempted to make its differences on immigration policy with the Coalition an election issue. The large share of Coalition voters who do not support the Coalition's high migration commitment (Table 11) might be a tempting target.

There appears to be no possibility, however, that the immigration question could generate the electoral and policy consequences that have resulted in the UK and Western Europe. No substantial third (or fourth) party has emerged in Australia that could play the disruptive role of UKIP in the UK.

Humanitarian program levels

The humanitarian program level could become an election issue, though in this case it is Labor that would be likely to be the electoral loser. The Labor Party Platform states that the party aspires to a 27,000 annual humanitarian target, as well as another 5000 for community

sponsored refugees.³⁹ It has also promised to reverse the Coalition's strict rules on granting permanent entry visas to the thousands of asylum seekers who sought to land in Australia by boat.

It is the case that the asylum question has since subsided as Labor has been forced to take a bipartisan stance on the issue.⁴⁰ However it is possible that the miserable circumstances in Afghanistan will put it back on the political agenda. If Labor does announce an expansive Afghan refugee target it will run into tough Coalition opposition.

Morrison has already made his stance plain. He has said that his government will 'only be resettling people through our official humanitarian program going through official channels'.⁴¹ He has also 'rebuffed calls for a special one-off humanitarian intake outside the 3000 places allocated' within the regular humanitarian program.⁴² Adding that he will not be giving people smugglers 'a product to sell and take advantage of people's misery'.⁴³

Social Issues

As we have shown, Labor has been the long-term electoral loser from its progressive stance on social issues. If the Coalition is forced to play catch up in retrieving its voter support prior to the next election, it is likely that it will wedge Labor on these issues.

There is some question about whether such a tactic would be as successful as in the past. This is because Labor has made some effort to mute its disadvantage on these issues.

Labor's unexpected loss at the May 2019 Federal election has prompted a degree of serious introspection within the party as to the cause of this failure.

Their internal review of the election results acknowledged that 'Labor has become a natural home ... for diverse interests and concerns, including gender equality the LGBTIQ community, racial equality and environmentalism'.⁴⁴ It acknowledged the possibility that Labor's embrace of these values might turn off support from 'traditional Labor voters'. The report says that:

Care needs to be taken to avoid Labor becoming a grievance-focussed organisation.⁴⁵

The review provides evidence that this situation is harming Labor's electoral prospects. It states that:

The average swing to Labor in 2019 in the 20 seats with the highest representation of university graduates was +3.78 per cent. This contrasts with an average swing of -4.22 per cent against Labor in the 20 seats with the lowest representation of university graduates.⁴⁶

Over the past couple of years, the Labor Party has reached out to regional electorates which have a strong presence of natural resource industries (notably coal) and to the blue-collar workers affected by the Party's greenhouse abatement commitments.

Labor has also telegraphed that it is prepared to compete more vigorously with the Coalition for the suburban vote. The current Shadow Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, has stated categorically that this section of the electorate is a priority focus. In mid-August 2021 Chalmers said that:

He would place the concerns of suburban and regional Australian - which he defines as middle Australia - above others.⁴⁷

Chalmers specifically referred to the Party’s back flip on some of the tax policies it had taken to the 2019 election. These included its proposals to reduce the existing concessions for negative gearing and capital gains. These proposals have been abandoned.

On these issues Labor may have miscalculated.

Figure 11 (above) shows that slightly over half of voters thought removing negative gearing concessions would be either a very important or important policy to improve first home buyers’ access to housing. Table 12 shows that a majority of intending Labor voters shared this opinion and that only 19 per cent were against it.

Table 12: Attitudes to removing negative gearing to improve first home buyers’ access to housing, by intended vote %

<i>This policy [is]</i>	Coalition	Labor	Greens	One Nation	Other	Total
Very important	18	23	34	23	12	21
Important	38	34	27	24	21	33
Should not be followed	30	19	16	26	25	24
Don’t know	14	24	23	28	42	22
Very important & important	56	57	61	47	33	54
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	1008	810	259	170	270	2516

Note: Full wording of the question is at Figure 11 above

Table 12 suggests that Labor’s 2019 policy on removing negative gearing was more likely to have been popular with people voting for One Nation or ‘other’ minor parties, or indeed with a particular segment of Coalition voters, than with Labor voters.

Apart from this foray into economic questions, so far federal Labor has not been willing to engage with the electoral down-side to its progressive stance on most social issues. Its 2021 platform is highly supportive of gender diversity, gender fluidity, identity group interests and other progressive causes.⁴⁸

It remains electorally vulnerable on this front.

Conclusion

There is a massive disjunction between elites and non-elites in Australia on population issues. Since Australia largely closed its borders to migrants in March 2020 business and employer interests as well as the media and most peak leaders in civil society have been putting the case for restoring Big Australia immigration levels.

There have been almost daily appeals from interests asserting that they cannot perform their role without an influx of migrants. The aged care industry wants more migrant carers, the tech industry more IT specialists, hospitals want more migrant nurses and doctors, universities want more overseas students, fruit and vegetable growers want an influx of Pacific Islanders and others to do the work that they say locals are not prepared to do.

Governments at the federal and state level have generally been supportive of these appeals. In extreme cases, as with Victoria, the Labor government (with support from the Liberal opposition) has based its business plan on providing debt-supported infrastructure (its 'big build'). This is to cater for a population that it projects will grow by another one million by 2026 (two thirds due to net overseas migration).⁴⁹

These federal and state responses indicate that, if implemented, in the post-pandemic era, immigration levels will reach at least the annual net 240,000 achieved prior to 2020.

TAPRI's 2021 survey of Australian voters' attitudes to these issues indicates that on population issues elites are not connecting with voters or, if they are, that most voters disagree with the message.

In the case of immigration levels, TAPRI asked voters whether they supported a return to Big Australia migration levels (around 240,000). The survey explained in the preamble to the question that this number was the level prevailing prior to 2020 and that it was contributing some 64 per cent of Australia's overall population growth at the time.

Only 19 per cent of respondents supported a return to this level. Most voters (Figure 1) wanted far less, including 28 per cent who favoured nil net migration.

In answer to the broader question about whether Australia needs more people, 69 per cent said that it did not (Figure 2). This level or higher has been recorded in previous surveys. However, in this case, the question was asked in a context where net immigration levels were negligible, and when advocates had been urgently pressing their case for a revival.

Why the public rejection of the Big Australia case? One explanation may be that even though we prefixed our question on immigration with the words 'when our borders reopen', implying after the pandemic, some respondents may have harboured fears that an immigration re-start would bring in an influx of Covid carriers.

Nevertheless, the 2021 survey was designed to explore whether respondents agreed with the underlying assumptions of those elites pressing for a return to high immigration levels. A distinct pattern emerges from the responses to these questions. The majority of voters do not support the elite assumption that Australia should be wide open to the movement of people and goods and services. Instead, they favour a more independent and self-reliant Australia, which implies giving priority to developing Australian sources of skills and locally produced goods and services.

On employment policy we asked whether voters supported the elite view that employers should be able to import the skilled workers they need in order to boost economic growth or, alternatively, that we should respond to worker shortages by raising wages and increasing

skills by training locals (Figure 2). Only 26 per cent of respondents supported the first option. 61 per cent supported the second option.

On recruiting more overseas students, we asked whether universities should be able to restore overseas student recruitment, or should recruitment stay low because universities had become too dependent on it, and that some have been neglecting local students (Figure 3). Just 33 per cent supported the first option, while 59 per cent supported the second option.

Finally, on trade policy we asked whether voters supported the elite view that Australia should resume full engagement in the global marketplace or alternatively should focus on becoming more independent and self-reliant. Some 35 per cent supported the open borders option as against 54 per cent support for the independent option (Figure 9).

Voters have another potent reason to reject elite claims about the merits of high immigration. This is the quality-of-life consequences of having to accommodate high numbers of additional migrants, especially in Australia's major urban centres. These concerns have been recorded repeatedly in previous surveys.⁵⁰

We asked the 69 per cent of respondents in the 2021 survey who did not think Australia needed more people about their views on these quality-of-life issues. Big majorities of this group of voters thought that there were major costs in congestion, housing prices, competition for hospital and school services and in stresses on the natural environment (Table 1).

Elites claim that the quality-of-life costs flowing from high migration can be mitigated, as by providing more higher density living opportunities and by the infrastructure 'big builds' being pursued in Melbourne and Sydney.

However, when asked about these strategies the weakest support of all was for high rise options. A much larger share of respondents thought lower immigration was a better option (Figure 11).

For high migration advocates evidence of voter resistance to Big Australia is often met with claims that this resistance reflects prejudice against migrants or worse—racism.

There is no denying that on occasions, when there had been organised opposition to immigration, as in the heyday of One Nation in the late 1990s, such sentiments can be stirred up. Also, it could be argued that during the Sydney and Melbourne lockdowns there has been a focus on the high incidence of Covid in suburbs with concentrations of non-English-speaking-background migrants (perhaps implying anti-migrant prejudice).

We think such judgements are unfair. Commentary about Covid levels in these suburbs has not been accompanied by overt prejudice towards the communities in question. Rather, the focus has been on how to help them cope with the pandemic.

Since March 2020 there has been no organised opposition to migration or multiculturalism in Australia, such as occurred in the UK in the run-up to the Brexit vote or to the 2019 UK general election that saw the huge Conservative victory over Labour.

One important piece of evidence is that opposition to Big Australia immigration levels is common across all birthplace groups, as the following table indicates. In none of the groups listed, including those born in Asia, does a majority support a return to the Big Australia level of 240,000 or more per year. The proportion of Australia-born voters supporting the various options is much the same as for the other birthplace groups. The one exception is the Asia-born, 30 per cent of whom support the 240,000 number. Nonetheless a majority of Asia-born voters support levels below this number.

Table 13: When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views?
By birthplace

	Australia	ESB	Europe	Asia	Other	Total
1...around 240,000 a year or higher	18	23	24	30	22	19
2...net migration at somewhat lower levels	22	23	17	20	18	22
3...net migration at much lower levels	20	19	17	18	20	20
4 [Nil net migration]	28	32	30	19	24	28
5 Don't know	12	4	11	12	15	11
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	2022	210	90	128	65	2516

Response categories:

- 1 We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher.
- 2 We should return to net migration at somewhat lower levels.
- 3 We should return to net migration at much lower levels.
- 4 We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures.
- 5 Don't know

Note: ESB stands for English-speaking-background countries.

As we have indicated, the magnitude of the gulf between the elites and non-elite voters on the question of immigration has had minimal political implications in the recent past. Coalition and Labor leaders have shared a bipartisan support for Big Australia immigration levels. While there have been tensions, particularly within the Coalition, these were papered over with the victory of the Morrison and internationalist factions over the Dutton faction in 2018.

For the forthcoming 2022 election, this bipartisanism is not so evident. Labor has moved towards a more sceptical stance on high immigration, partly reflecting its leaders' awareness that to win it must become more sensitive to 'suburban' voters' concerns.

In a close election Labor might be prepared to make immigration levels an issue, given that the Morrison government has made its determination to renew the program so evident. Labor remains vulnerable, however, on progressive social questions.

Appendix A

Full wording of the immigration question:

‘Immigration increased sharply over the 10 years to December 2019. Over this decade Australia added 4 million extra people, more than the current population of Brisbane and Adelaide together (3.6 million).

‘Over 64% of this growth was due to net overseas migration. Up until 2020 this has been around 240,000 migrants per year.

‘When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views?’

Table A.1: When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views?

	%
We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher	19
We should return to net migration at somewhat lower levels	22
We should return to net migration at much lower levels	20
We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures	28
Don't know	11
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.2: Many employers now argue that we must open the borders as soon as possible, to allow temporary and permanent migrant workers in to help the economy. What do you think?

	%
They are right. We should let in as many migrant workers as employers want in order to boost economic growth	26
They are wrong. We should deal with worker shortages by raising wages and improving skills training for locals	61
Don't know	12
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.3: Before the pandemic Australia's universities recruited large numbers of overseas students. In 2018 they made up 32 per cent of all new student enrolments. The universities want governments to allow these numbers to be restored to their pre-Covid levels.

Which of the following is closest to your views?

	%
Recruitment of overseas students should be restored, because their education here amounts to an important export industry. They also contribute to the local economy and university finances.	33
Their recruitment should stay low. Our universities have become too dependent on them, and some universities have neglected providing for local students.	58
Don't know	9
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.4: To what extent would you support or oppose the following measure to limit the spread of Covid-19? The closure of international borders to all foreign travellers? By state or territory

	NSW	Vic	Qld	SA	WA	ACT	Tas	NT	Total
Strongly oppose	7	6	6	6	5	4	5	6	6
Oppose	10	13	9	13	10	9	3	10	11
Neither oppose nor support	19	17	21	21	18	18	13	7	19
Support	33	33	32	31	34	43	45	45	33
Strongly support	31	31	32	28	33	25	34	32	31
Total oppose	17	19	15	19	15	13	8	16	17
Total support	64	64	64	60	67	69	79	77	65
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	806	642	499	183	264	43	55	23	2516

Table A.5: To what extent would you support or oppose the following measure to limit the spread of Covid-19? The closure of international borders to all returning Australian citizens and permanent residents? By state or territory

	NSW	Vic	QLD	SA	WA	ACT	Tas	NT	Total
Strongly oppose	17	18	21	14	17	19	19	14	18
Oppose	27	27	30	32	30	38	28	21	28
Neither oppose nor support	28	21	21	22	23	24	18	18	23
Support	17	25	19	17	20	13	26	41	20
Strongly support	11	8	10	14	11	7	9	5	10
Total oppose	45	45	51	46	47	57	47	35	46
Total support	28	34	29	31	31	19	36	47	30
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	806	642	499	183	264	43	55	23	2516

Table A.6: During the pandemic State Governments have tried to exclude people who might carry the virus, either those arriving from overseas or from other states. What is your view on the states closing their borders? By State or Territory %

	NSW	Vic	Qld	SA	WA	ACT	Tas	NT	Total
Closing state borders is necessary, given the risks.	58	69	74	75	79	78	71	74	68
The risks are overstated and closing state borders should be kept to a minimum.	36	26	22	17	17	22	22	26	27
Don't know	6	5	4	8	4	0	7	0	5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	806	642	499	183	264	43	55	23	2516

Table A.7: When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views by How has the pandemic affected your income and job opportunities? %

	It's made things better	It's had very little or no effect	It's made things worse	Total
We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher	33	19	17	19
We should return to net migration at somewhat lower levels	26	23	19	22
We should return to net migration at much lower levels	17	20	20	20
We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures	18	27	33	28
Don't know	7	11	13	11
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	218	1593	705	2516
<i>Percent made things better, had little effect, or made things worse</i>	9	63	28	100

Table A.8: Overall do you think Australia needs more people?

	%
Yes	31
No	69
Total	100
	2516

Table A.9: After the Covid-19 pandemic, what do you think Australia's foreign policy should be? %

We should focus on becoming more independent and self-reliant	56
We shouldn't try to separate ourselves from other countries and should try to take up opportunities in the global marketplace once again	35
Don't know	9
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.10: Housing prices have risen since the pandemic began, making it harder for first home buyers to buy a home. How important does this issue seem to you? %

It is Australia's most serious social problem	20
It is one of a number of important problems	67
It is not an important problem	8
Don't know	4
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.11: Which of the following policies do you think should be followed to improve first home buyers' access to housing? For each policy chose one of the responses that follow.

	Q23 Encourage extending housing development in the outer suburbs.	Q24 Keep immigration low	Q21 Remove negative gearing	Q22 Encourage the development of more high-rise apartments.
Very important	20	27	21	7
Important	56	39	33	31
Should not be followed	13	21	24	48
Don't know	11	13	22	14
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total N	2516	2516	2516	2516

Table A.12: A number of people who were born male now identify as female. Do you think they should be allowed to compete in women's sports? %

Yes	22
No	60
Don't know	18
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.13: Some people argue that a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman, regardless of their sex when born. What do you think? %

Strongly agree	12
Agree	18
Neither agree nor disagree	25
Disagree	21
Strongly disagree	23
Total agree	30
Total disagree	45
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.14: The Australian government is considering giving separate representation to Indigenous Australians in a special, elected body called a 'voice to parliament' so that they can advance their interests.

What is your opinion?

They should have a separate 'voice' to parliament.	33
They should not have a separate 'voice' to parliament because all Australians should be treated as equals. A separate voice could encourage racial and ethnic divisions.	56
Don't know	11
Total %	100
Total N	2516

Table A.15: ‘When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views’ by age, non-graduates only %

	18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65 plus	Total non-graduates
1... around 240,000 a year or higher	28	23	19	18	9	15	14	12	12	11	16
2... net migration at somewhat lower levels	19	27	30	21	16	18	17	15	13	22	20
3... net migration at much lower levels	20	7	13	27	23	21	25	20	25	24	21
4 [Nil net migration]	14	17	30	19	34	38	35	38	40	39	31
4 Don't know	18	26	8	14	18	8	10	15	9	4	12
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	246	138	138	111	118	140	140	146	132	436	1745

Response categories:

- 1 We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher.
- 2 We should return to net migration at somewhat lower levels.
- 3 We should return to net migration at much lower levels.
- 4 We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures.
- 5 Don't know

Table A.16: ‘When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views’ by age, graduates only %

	18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65 plus	Total graduates
1... around 240,000 a year or higher	32	32	32	30	26	28	25	27	12	23	27
2... net migration at somewhat lower levels	34	26	30	26	29	23	25	30	14	23	26
3... net migration at much lower levels	11	18	14	12	10	14	13	16	46	22	17
4 [Nil net migration]	11	13	12	19	21	28	24	19	28	28	20
4 Don't know	11	10	12	14	13	7	12	8	0	5	10
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	43	95	105	101	107	71	65	56	52	76	771

For response categories see Table A.15.

Appendix B

Methods

The survey ran from 23 July 2021 to 31 July 2021. Questions were chosen, and the analysis done, by TAPRI: the fieldwork was organised and carried out by Andrew Elturk. He drew on the internet panel run by the Online Research Unit and collected data from a random national sample of 2,520 people from their panel of 300,000. The survey was restricted to voters. Quotas were set with a 10 percent leeway in line with the ABS distribution for age, gender, and location.

The final data were then weighted to the actual age, gender, location and graduate/non-graduate status distribution according to the ABS Census. Participants were offered points as token rewards (these could be used to gain access to a cash raffle, or taken as a \$1 payment, or donated to charity). The survey took them approximately ten minutes to complete.

The graduate/non-graduate variable for weights was based on the proportions in either group of voters by single year of age (18 plus) and gender at the 2016 census. (Data extracted using TableBuilder Pro.) These proportions were then adjusted upwards for 2021, guided by ABS population data on educational attainment for people aged 15 to 64 in 2020. (See ABS, Education and Work Australia, 2020, Table 26.)

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We of course bear the responsibility for any shortcomings in this text.

Appendix C: 2021 TAPRI Questionnaire

1 After the Covid-19 pandemic, what do you think Australia's foreign policy should be?

- 1 We should focus on becoming more independent and self-reliant
- 2 We shouldn't try to separate ourselves from other countries and should try to take up opportunities in the global marketplace once again.
- 3 Don't know

2 Immigration increased sharply over the 10 years to December 2019. Over this decade Australia added 4 million extra people, more than the current population of Brisbane and Adelaide together (3.6 million). Over 64% of this growth was due to net overseas migration. Up until 2020 this has been around 240,000 migrants per year.

When our borders reopen which of the following would be closest to your views:

- 1 We should return to net migration of around 240,000 a year or higher.
- 2 We should return to net migration at somewhat lower levels.
- 3 We should return to net migration at much lower levels.
- 4 We should keep migration low enough so that new arrivals just balance out departures.
- 5 Don't know

3 Many employers now argue that we must open the borders as soon as possible, to allow temporary and permanent migrant workers in to help the economy. What do you think?

- 1 They are right. We should let in as many migrant workers as employers want in order to boost economic growth. [Go to Q4]
- 2 They are wrong. We should deal with worker shortages by raising wages and improving skills training for locals. [Go to Q5]
- 3 Don't know [Go to Q6]

[for those who chose 1 in Q3]

4 Which of the following parties best represent your views on allowing many migrant workers in?

- 1 Nationals
- 2 Liberals
- 3 Labor
- 4 Greens
- 5 One Nation
- 6 None of these

[for those who chose 2 in Q3]

5 Which of the following parties best represent your views on allowing many migrant workers in?

- 1 Nationals
- 2 Liberals
- 3 Labor
- 4 Greens
- 5 One Nation
- 6 None of these

[Whole sample answers Q6 and the following questions]

6 To what extent would you support or oppose the following measure to limit the spread of Covid-19?
The closure of international borders to all foreign travellers?

- 1 Strongly oppose
- 2 Oppose
- 3 Neither oppose nor support
- 4 Support
- 5 Strongly support

7 To what extent would you support or oppose the following measure to limit the spread of Covid-19?

The closure of international borders to all returning Australian citizens and permanent residents?

- 1 Strongly oppose
- 2 Oppose
- 3 Neither oppose nor support
- 4 Support
- 5 Strongly support

8 During the pandemic State Governments have tried to exclude people who might carry the virus, either those arriving from overseas or from other states. What is your view on the states closing their borders?

- 1 Closing state borders is necessary, given the risks.
- 2 The risks are overstated and closing state borders should be kept to a minimum.
- 3 Don't know

9 Before the pandemic Australia's universities recruited large numbers of overseas students. In 2018 they made up 32 per cent of all new student enrolments. The universities want governments to allow these numbers to be restored to their pre-Covid levels.

Which of the following is closest to your views?

- 1 Recruitment of overseas students should be restored, because their education here amounts to an important export industry. They also contribute to the local economy and university finances.
- 2 Their recruitment should stay low. Our universities have become too dependent on them, and some universities have neglected providing for local students.
- 3 Don't know

10 Overall, do you think Australia needs more people?

- 1 Yes [Go to question 11]
- 2 No [Go to questions 12-16]

[For those who answered 1, 'yes', to Q 10]

11 How would you like Australia's population to grow?

- 1 While some migrants would come, I would prefer that we supported Australian parents having the number of children they wanted
- 2 While some support should be given to parents, I would prefer that we encouraged more migrants to come
- 3 I would prefer both support to parents for children and encouragement for immigration.
- 4 Don't know

[Then go to question 17]

[Questions 12 to 16 are for those who answered 2, 'no', to Q 10]

This is because:

12 Our cities are overcrowded and there is too much traffic.

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 agree strongly | 2 agree | 3 neither agree nor | 4 disagree | 5 disagree strongly |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | disagree <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

13 Our hospitals and schools are overcrowded.

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 agree strongly | 2 agree | 3 neither agree nor | 4 disagree | 5 disagree strongly |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | disagree <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

14 The natural environment is under stress with the number of people we already have.

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 agree strongly | 2 agree | 3 neither agree nor | 4 disagree | 5 disagree strongly |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | disagree <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

15 Adding more people will drive down wages.

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 agree strongly | 2 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 4 disagree | 5 disagree strongly |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

16 Adding more people will push up the cost of housing

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 agree strongly | 2 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 4 disagree | 5 disagree strongly |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

[Then go to Q17]

[All respondents answer Q17]

17 Do you think that people who raise questions about immigration being too high are sometimes seen as racist?

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| 1 Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> | [Go to question 18] |
| 2 No | <input type="checkbox"/> | [Go to question 19] |
| 3 Don't know | <input type="checkbox"/> | [Go to question 19] |

18 This is:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| 1 Because they usually are racist | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2 Unfair because very few of them are racist | <input type="checkbox"/> |

[Then go to Q19]

[All respondents answer Q19 to Q28]

19 Have you yourself ever felt uncomfortable raising questions about immigration, for example with friends or co-workers?

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| 1 Yes, people can get the wrong idea about you if you do. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2 I haven't wanted to question it; I'm okay with things as they are. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3 I'm happy to speak against it, even if others don't agree. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4 I'm happy to speak in favour of it, even if others don't agree. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5 I don't know enough about immigration to discuss it. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

20 Housing prices have risen since the pandemic began, making it harder for first home buyers to buy a home. How important does this issue seem to you?

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| 1 It is Australia's most serious social problem | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2 It is one of a number of important problems | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3 It is not an important problem | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4 Don't know | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Which of the following policies do you think should be followed to improve first home buyers' access to housing? For each policy chose one of the responses that follow.

21 Remove negative gearing tax concessions for housing investors.

(Sometimes owners of investment properties don't make enough money from rents to cover the cost of their mortgage on the property and other expenses. If this happens they can claim the loss as an income tax deduction. It's called 'negative gearing'.)

A policy to remove this concession is:

Very important , important , should not be followed , don't know

22 Encourage the development of more high-rise apartments.

Very important , important , should not be followed , don't know

23 Encourage extending housing development in the outer suburbs.

Very important , important , should not be followed , don't know

24 Keep immigration low to reduce competition for existing housing.
Very important [], important [], should not be followed [], don't know []

26 If a federal election for the House of Representatives were held today, which one of the following would you vote for? If "uncommitted" to which one of these do you have a leaning?

- 1 Liberals []
- 2 Nationals []
- 3 Liberal National Party []
- 4 Country Liberals (NT) []
- 5 Labor []
- 6 Greens []
- 7 One Nation []
- 8 Other []

And now a few questions on different topics

26 A number of people who were born male now identify as female. Do you think they should be allowed to compete in women's sports?

- 1 Yes []
- 2 No []
- 3 Don't know []

27 Some people argue that a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman, regardless of their sex when born. What do you think?

- 1 Strongly agree []
- 2 Agree []
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree []
- 4 Disagree []
- 5 Strongly disagree []

28 The Australian government is considering giving separate representation to Indigenous Australians in a special, elected body called a 'voice to parliament' so that they can advance their interests.

What is your opinion?

- 1 They should have a separate 'voice' to parliament []
- 2 They should not have a separate 'voice' to parliament because all Australians should be treated as equals. A separate voice could encourage racial and ethnic divisions. []
- 3 Don't know []

And now some questions about yourself:

29 Do you (or you and a partner) own the place where you usually live?

- 1 Yes, outright [] [Go to question 32]
- 2 Yes, with a mortgage [] [Go to question 32]
- 3 No [] [Go to questions 30 and 31]

[For non-owners, those who chose 3 in Q29]

30 Which of the following best describes your housing situation?

- 1 Renting []
- 2 Living with parents []
- 3 Homeless []
- 4 Have some other housing arrangement []

[For non-owners, those who chose 3 in Q29]

31 Which of the following is most true of you?

- 1 I expect to own a home (a house or apartment) in the next 10 years. []

- 2 I would like to be a homeowner within the next 10 years but this will be hard to achieve.
- 3 I'm not interested in being a homeowner.
- 4 I have an investment property now but chose not to live in it.
- 5 None of the above

[All respondents answer Q32 to Q35]

32 How has the pandemic affected your income and job opportunities?

- 1 It's made things better
- 2 It's had very little or no effect
- 3 It's made things worse

33 How has the pandemic affected your family life? (For example, with supervising children, relationship with a partner, caring for elderly parents)

- 1 It's made things better
- 2 It's had very little or no effect
- 3 It's made things worse

34 What is the highest qualification you have gained since leaving school?

- 1 No qualification since leaving school, and not currently studying
- 2 No qualification since leaving school, but currently studying at a university
- 3 No qualification since leaving school, but currently studying at a TAFE or other vocational college

Your qualification—check the box for your highest qualification only

- 4 University degree, bachelor or post grad *Go to Q35*
- 5 Vocational college diploma
- 6 Other vocational diploma
- 7 Trade qualification

[All non-graduate respondents skip Q35 and go to Q36, Q 37 & Q38]

[For those who said their highest qualification was a university degree, bachelor or postgrad, ie who chose 4 in Q34]

35 Which of the groupings below include the field of study of your highest university qualification?

- 1 Science, IT, Engineering, Architecture, and related studies
- 2 Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, and related health studies
- 3 Education
- 4 Management and Commerce
- 5 Law
- 6 Society and Culture (including humanities and social science)
- 7 Creative Arts
- 8 Other

[All respondents answer questions 36 to 39]

In which country or region were you, your mother and your father born?

Please write the appropriate number in the spaces below

Australia	1	Vietnam	14
New Zealand	2	The Philippines	15
Other Oceania	3	Other Asia	16
United Kingdom	4	Israel	17
Republic of Ireland	5	Other Middle East	18
Italy	6	North Africa	19
Germany	7	South Africa	20
Greece	8	Other Africa	21
Netherlands	9	North America	22
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia)	10	Central America	23
		South America	24
Other Europe	11	Other	25
China	12	Don't know	26
India	13		

Q36 Yourself

Q37 Your mother

Q38 Your father

39 Are you of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin?

- 1 No
- 2 Yes, Aboriginal
- 3 Yes, Torres Strait Islander
- 4 [Yes, both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

Thank you

References

- ¹ Calculated from ABS spreadsheet 3101.0 National, state and territory population, TABLE 1. Population Change, Summary - Australia ('000)
- ² It did however ask whether a lower rate of immigration posed a possible threat 'to the vital interests of Australia over the next ten years'. Only nine per cent said that it did. By contrast 59 per cent said that 'Covid-19 and other potential epidemics' did pose such a threat. Natasha Kassam, Lowy Institute Poll 2021, 2021, P. 17
- ³ The wording was adopted from the Australian Election Studies which have used it since the mid 1990s. In 2017 and 2018 TAPRI did not provide an explanatory preamble. In 2019 the question was preceded by this statement: 'From 2007 to 2018 Australia's population grew from 20.8 million to just under 25 million. As of October 2019 it was 25.5 million. Sixty per cent of this growth has been due to net overseas migration.'
- ⁴ See for example, Geoff Chambers, 'Lift iso capacity to restart migration': Property Council of Australia chief', *The Australian online*, 1 March 2021, Jacob Greber, 'Crunch time on labour shortages', *The Australian Financial Review*, April 30 2021; Rosie Lewis and Robyn Ironside, 'Australia must 'live with Covid', prominent Australians urge', *The Australian online*, 21 May 2021; Rosie Lewis, 'Hospitality bid for special foreign staff visas', *The Australian online*, 20 April 2021; R. Mizen, 'RBA foray into migration debate "unhelpful"', *The Australian Financial Review*, 9 July 2021; Greg Brown, 'Slashing international arrivals 'will hurt economy' say business groups', *The Australian online*, 3 July 2021.
- ⁵ See Ewan Hannan, 'Call to ease foreign student work visa limits', *The Australian online*, 8 April 2021; Farrah Tomazin, Royce Millar and Adam Carey, 'Universities hatch desperate plan to fly students in, quarantine them', *The Age online*, 8 April 2021; Richard Ferguson, 'Plea for help to get students back', *The Australian*, 1 December 2020, p. 5; Richard Ferguson, 'Pilot scheme to fly in overseas university students', *The Australian*, 18 June 2020, p. 3
- ⁶ Federal Financial Relations: Budget Paper No. 3 2021-22, Commonwealth of Australia, 2021, Table A.5, p. 104. These forecasts are also incorporated into the 2021 Intergenerational Report which assumes NOM recovering to 235,000 p.a. by 2024-25 and staying at that level up to 2060-61. Intergenerational Report: Australia over the next 40 years, Commonwealth of Australia, 2021, p. 16
- ⁷ In the October/November 2019 survey 20 per cent of voters thought the existing high numbers should be increased while 30 per cent thought they should remain about the same. See Katharine Betts and Bob Birrell, 'A big Australia: why it may all be over', The Australian Population Research Institute, Melbourne, 2020, Table 2, p. 3.
- ⁸ The 2019 question read: 'From 2007 to 2018 Australia's population grew from 20.8 million to just under 25 million. As of October 2019 it was 25.5 million. Sixty per cent of this growth has been due to net overseas migration. Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia nowadays should be reduced or increased? Increased a lot, increased a little, remain about the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot.' Responses: Increased a lot or a little, 20%, remain about the same, 30%, reduced a little of a lot, 50%. See Betts and Birrell, op. cit., p. 3. This result was similar to the results in 2017 and 2018 where no preamble was used.
- ⁹ Kassam, 2021, op. cit., p. 17
- ¹⁰ Craig Butt, Liam Mannix and Nigel Gladstone, 'NSW overtakes Victoria for total COVID-19 cases through pandemic', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 August 2021 <<https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw-overtakes-victoria-for-total-covid-19-cases-through-pandemic-20210826-p58maa.html>>
- ¹¹ See for example 'Australia's population shrinks for the first time since WWI as COVID turns off immigration tap' abc.net.au 24 March 2021 <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-24/population-declines-as-covid-border-closures-bite/13256938>>; Simon Benson and Patrick Commins, 'Australia's population to shrink over next 40 years, budget deficit for decades', *The Australian online*, 27 June 2021; Robin Christie, 'Australia's shrinking populations', *Your Investment Property*, 5 April 2021 <yourinvestmentpropertymag.com.au/news/australias-shrinking-populations-127951.aspx>

- ¹² Australian Bureau of Statistics data make it clear that in the year to December 2020 Australia's population grew by 136,300 people, and that 97.6 per cent of this growth was due to natural increase. *National, state and territory population*, reference period December 2020. <abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/national-state-and-territory-population/latest-release>
- ¹³ Bob Hawke explicitly acknowledged this in his opening address to the Politics of Immigration conference in Brisbane, 24 May 1993. He said, of the work of Ian McAllister: '...what McAllister is saying is that there has been an implicit pact between the major parties to implement broad policies on immigration that they know are not generally endorsed by the electorate, and that they have done this by keeping the subject off the political agenda. Now, from the broad experience I have had and the knowledge I have acquired first hand I must say that I find it difficult to resist the basic thrust of McAllister's hypothesis.' R. J. Hawke, Address, Brisbane (May 24-25), 1993
- ¹⁴ Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford, *Brexit Land*, Cambridge, 2020, Chapter 3
- ¹⁵ Erica Consterdine, *Labour's Immigration Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 74
- ¹⁶ Sobolewska and Ford, op. cit., pp. 157-158
- ¹⁷ See David Goodhart, *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics*, London, 2017, pp. 119, 150-159, 167, 177.
- ¹⁸ Alan Abramowitz, *The Great Alignment*, Yale, 2018
- ¹⁹ Katharine Betts and Bob Birrell, *A Big Australia: why it may all be over*, TAPRI October 2020, p. 29
- ²⁰ The weights for citizens who were either graduates or non-graduates were based on data from the 2016 Census derived with TableBuilder Pro, augmented with estimates for increases from 2016 to 2021 derived from ABS survey data published in Education and Work, Australia, 2020, Table 26.
- ²¹ Data from the 2019 Australian Election Study suggest that 57 per cent of the 'other' vote went to right-leaning parties, 14 per cent to centrist parties and 14 per cent to left-leaning parties, and 16 per cent to independents. Among non-graduates 63 per cent of the 'other' vote went to right-leaning parties. See Table A8; Vote for parties labelled 'other' in 2019. Betts and Birrell, 2020, op. cit., p. 41
- ²² Katharine Betts, 'Class and the 1996 election', *People and Place*, 1996, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 38-45
- ²³ See Tom Whipple, 'Richard Dawkins loses award over 'demeaning' transgender tweets', *The Australian online*, 21 April 2021; Cordelia Fine, 'It's the unspoken rules on campus that silence', *The Australian online*, 27 May 2021; Peta Credlin, 'Bureaucrat's paint women out of the picture', *The Australian online*, 2 September 2021
- ²⁴ Twenty-two per cent of non-graduates agreed that 'people who were born male [and] now identify as female...should be allowed to compete in women's sports' as did 23 per cent of graduates. But 62 per cent of non-graduates disagreed compared to 56 per cent of graduates. Overall 60 per cent disagreed and 18 per cent said 'don't know.'
- ²⁵ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Backlash*, Cambridge, 2019
- ²⁶ Calculated from the Australian Election Study, 1996, Jones, R., Gow, D., McAllister, I. (1996). *Australian Election Study 1996* [computer file], June 1996
- ²⁷ *The Australian*, 27 September 2021, p. 4
- ²⁸ The Resolve poll was published on 22 August 2021. As far as the minor parties were concerned it had the Greens on 12 per cent, and the total for other parties on 15 per cent. See <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/coalition-gains-on-pandemic-management-as-morrison-holds-ground-labor-vote-falls-20210823-p581an.html>, 24 August 2021
- ²⁹ Newspoll on June 27 had the Coalition at 40%, Labor at 37%, Greens 11%, One Nation 3%, Other 13%. Over time, on the primary vote Newspoll had the Coalition ahead of Labor from the 28th of April 2019 to the 27 June 2021, except for the 14th of March 2021 when it was level with Labor. It was also level with Labor on the 18th of July and 8th of August 2021. See <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/newspoll>
- ³⁰ The Covid 19 data site makes the pattern of infections clear. The first wave ran from mid-March to mid-April 2020, the second from early July to mid-September 2020, and the third began in early July 2021. There was a long lull with minimal daily infections between October 2020 and June 2021. The third wave began first in NSW. By the 20th July 2021 new cases in NSW were averaging 97 a day. See <www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=covid+19+data> There were virtually no

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- Covid-related deaths from early December 2020 to 30th of June 2021, but from then on the numbers began to rise. See <<https://covid19.healthdata.org/australia?view=daily-deaths&tab=trend>>
- ³¹ See Joseph Dunstan, ‘Melbourne marks 200 days of COVID-19 lockdowns since the pandemic began’, ABC News, 19/8/2021 <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-08-19/melbourne-200-days-of-covid-lockdowns-victoria/100386078>>
- ³² Essential Report, *Federal government response to Covid-19*, 28 September 2021
- ³³ Philip Lowe, Governor of the Reserve Bank, quoted in Shane Wright and Jennifer Duke, ‘Immigration levels helped keep wages low for years: RBA Governor’, *The Age online*, 8 July 2021; Ross Garnaut quoted in Gareth Hutchens, ‘If you’ve been feeling poorer over the last decade, this graph explains why’, ABC News, 7 March 2021; Judith Sloan, ‘Government clearly planning a return to high immigration’, *The Australian online*, 13 April 2021, Ross Gittins, ‘Cutting workers’ pay and conditions worsens our productivity’, *The Sydney Morning Herald online*, 3 April 2021
- ³⁴ The Greens policies on immigration and refugees are set out here: <https://greens.org.au/policies/immigration-and-refugees>
- ³⁵ Bob Birrell, ‘The 2019 election and the impending migrant parent deluge’, TAPRI, May 2019
- ³⁶ See AWU national secretary Daniel Walton quoted in E. Hannan, ‘Ripped off fruit pickers ‘dumpster dive’ for food’, *The Australian online*, 11 July 2021 and Ewin Hannan, ‘Union bid to scrap picker pay rip off’, *The Australian online*, 22 March 2021.
- ³⁷ Kristina Keneally, ‘Do we want migrants to return in the same numbers? The answer is no’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 May 2020
- ³⁸ Betts and Birrell, 2020, op. cit., p.33
- ³⁹ *ALP National Platform: As adopted at the 2021 Special Platform Conference*, <https://alp.org.au/media/2594/2021-alp-national-platform-final-endorsed-platform.pdf>, p. 123
- ⁴⁰ See for example Laurie Oakes, ‘Prime Minister Kevin Rudd is turning back the tide on the boats’, *The Herald Sun online*, 19 July 2013.
- ⁴¹ Angie Raphael and Courtney Gould, ‘Scott Morrison rules out following path of Canada, will only resettle Afghan nationals through “official channels”’, *The Australian online*, 22 August 2021
- ⁴² Matt Coughlan, ‘Morrison defends Afghan refugee allocation’, *The Canberra Times online*, 31 August 2021
- ⁴³ Rob Harris, ‘Christian leaders urge Morrison to take more Afghan refugees’, *The Sydney Morning Herald online*, 22 August 2021
- ⁴⁴ Craig Emerson and Jay Weatherill, *Review of Labor’s 2019 federal election campaign*, 2019, p. 38
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 63
- ⁴⁷ Troy Bramston, ‘Architect of New Labor has a clear vision for our future’, *Weekend Australian*, 14-15 August, 2021
- ⁴⁸ See *ALP National Platform*, op. cit.
- ⁴⁹ https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0032/332996/Victoria_in_Future_2019.pdf
- ⁵⁰ Betts and Birrell, 2020, op. cit. p. 5